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DELEGATION AND TIME
JONATHAN H. ADLER* & CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER**
105 IOWA LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2020)
Most concerns about delegation are put in terms of the handover
of legislative power to federal agencies and the magnitude of the
legislative policy decisions made by such agencies. Likewise, most
reform proposals, such as the Congressional Review Act and the
proposed REINS Act, address these gap-filling, democratic-deficit
concerns. The same is true of the judicially created nondelegation
canons, such as the major questions doctrine and other clear-statement
rules. This Article addresses a different, under-explored dimension of
the delegation problem: the temporal complications of congressional
delegation. In other words, broad congressional delegations of
authority at one time period become a source of authority for agencies
to take action at a later time that was wholly unanticipated by the
enacting Congress or could no longer receive legislative support. This
problem has taken on added significance in the current era of
congressional inaction.
To address this distinct, temporal problem of delegation, we
suggest that Congress revive the practice of regular reauthorization of
statutes that govern federal regulatory action. In some circumstances,
this will require Congress to consider adding reauthorization
incentives, such as sun-setting provisions. In other regulatory contexts,
Congress may well decide the costs of mandatory reauthorization
outweigh the benefits. Nevertheless, we argue that Congress should
more regularly use this longstanding legislative tool to mitigate the
democratic deficits that accompany broad delegations of lawmaking
authority to federal agencies and spur more regular legislative
engagement with federal regulatory policy. A return to reauthorization
would also strengthen the partnership between Congress and the
administrative state as well as mitigate some of the major concerns
that have been raised in recent years regarding Chevron deference.
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INTRODUCTION
Last Term, in Gundy v. United States, the Supreme Court once again
considered whether a statutory grant of authority to a federal agency or
executive branch official (here, the Attorney General) violates the
nondelegation doctrine.1 Article I of the Constitution commands that “[a]ll
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States.”2 The Court has long interpreted Article I as prohibiting
Congress from delegating legislative powers to the other branches of
government (or anyone else).3 It has also held, however, that Congress
can delegate discretion to federal agencies to implement legislation if the
legislation provides an “intelligible principle”4—“clearly delineat[ing] the
general policy, the public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries
of that delegated authority.”5 And, once again, in Gundy, a majority of the
Court rejected the constitutional challenge, with the plurality concluding
that the statutory “delegation easily passes constitutional muster.”6
Although the nondelegation doctrine technically remains the law of
the land, the Supreme Court has only struck down two (or maybe three)
statutory delegations as unconstitutional—all back in the 1930s.7 Since
1 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2121 (2019).
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
3 See Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989) (“[W]e long have insisted

that ‘the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution’ mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative
power to another Branch.” (quoting Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892)).
4 J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
5 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)
6 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2121 (plurality per Kagan. J.); cf. id. at 2131 (Alito,
J., concurring in judgment) (“Because I cannot say that the statute lacks a
discernable standard that is adequate under the approach this Court has taken
for many years, I vote to affirm.”).
7 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). As Cass Sunstein quipped,
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then, there have been many unsuccessful challenges, of which Gundy is
but the most recent.8 These nondelegation challenges, like the challenge
in Gundy,9 have focused almost entirely on the breadth and substance of
legislative delegation and whether it complies with the intelligible
principle test. In other words, the judicial inquiry has examined the
substantive transfer of lawmaking authority from Congress to the
administrative state.
Gundy, however, is also noteworthy because only four Justices were
willing to continue to embrace a toothless nondelegation doctrine. Justice
Alito cast the fifth and decisive vote because “it would be freakish to single
out the provision at issue here for special treatment.”10 Justice Alito made
clear, however, that “[i]f a majority of this Court were willing to reconsider
the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I would support that
effort.”11 Justice Gorsuch, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice
Thomas, dissented, arguing that the statute at issue did not pass the
intelligible principle test and, moreover, the current, “mutated version of
the ‘intelligible principle’ remark has no basis in the original meaning of
the Constitution, in history, or even in the decision from which it was
plucked.”12 Although Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in the case,
scholars are already predicting that “perhaps we will not need to wait
another twenty years for that next case raising the nondelegation
doctrine.”13 Indeed, Justice Kavanaugh has since made his views known,

“We might say that the conventional doctrine has had one good year, and 211 bad
ones (and counting).” Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
315, 322 (2000). Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry are the two cases usually
cited as the only successful nondelegation doctrine challenges, but the Court in
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936), seemed to invalidate one
provision of the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act on nondelegation grounds in
an opinion that struck down the rest of the law for violating the Commerce
Clause. But see Alexander “Sasha” Volokh, The Shadow Debate over Private
Nondelegation in DOT v. Association of American Railroads, 2014-2015 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 359, 372 (2014) (arguing that “when the Carter Coal Court talks
about ‘legislative delegation in its most obnoxious form,’ it’s much more plausible
that this refers to the Due Process Clause”).
8 See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 (2001)
(surveying unsuccessful nondelegation challenges).
9 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2148 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
nondelegation doctrine should not permit Congress to “hand off to the nation’s
chief prosecutor the power to write his own criminal code”).
10 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
11 Id.
12 Id. at 2139 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
13 Kristin E. Hickman, Gundy, Nondelegation, and Never-Ending Hope, REG.
REV. (July 8, 2019), https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/08/hickmannondelegation/; accord Mila Sohoni, Opinion Analysis: Court Refuses To Resurrect
Nondelegation Doctrine, SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 20, 2019) (“For the nondelegation
doctrine, the significance of Gundy lies not in what the Supreme Court did today,
but in what the dissent and the concurrence portend for tomorrow.”),

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3510688
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423062

4

WORKING DRAFT

[Dec. 2019

also expressing interest in reinvigorating the nondelegation doctrine,
with a particular focus on prohibiting “congressional delegations to
agencies of authority to decide major policy questions.”14
The Supreme Court has not invalidated a statute on nondelegation
doctrine grounds in more than eight decades, but the Court has embraced
a number of normative canons or clear-statement rules that address
nondelegation concerns through statutory interpretation.15 Or, as Justice
Gorsuch put it in his Gundy dissent:
When one legal doctrine becomes unavailable to do its intended work,
the hydraulic pressures of our constitutional system sometimes shift
the responsibility to different doctrines. And that’s exactly what's
happened here. We still regularly rein in Congress’s efforts to
delegate legislative power; we just call what we’re doing by different
names.16

Clear statement rules and various canons of construction serve to address
nondelegation concerns.
The statutory challenge to the Affordable Care Act, King v. Burwell,
is illustrative. There, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the Court, applied
the major questions doctrine to refuse the IRS Chevron deference. This
was due to the economic or political significance of the question and the
IRS’s lack of expertise in answering such questions.17 Reflecting
nondelegation concerns, Chief Justice Roberts concluded: “Whether those
credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep
‘economic and political significance’ that is central to this statutory
scheme; had Congress wished to assign that question to an agency, it
surely would have done so expressly.”18 Like the nondelegation doctrine
itself, the nondelegation canons of statutory interpretation focus on the

https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/opinion-analysis-court-refuses-to-resurrectnondelegation-doctrine/.
14 Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari).
15 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 7, at 315–16 (“I believe that the
[nondelegation] doctrine is alive and well. It has been relocated rather than
abandoned. . . . Rather than invalidating federal legislation as excessively openended, courts hold that federal administrative agencies may not engage in certain
activities unless and until Congress has expressly authorized them to do so. The
relevant choices must be made legislatively rather than bureaucratically. As a
technical matter, the key holdings are based not on the nondelegation doctrine
but on certain ‘canons’ of construction.”).
16 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
17 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488–89 (2015); see also Jonathan H.
Adler & Michael F. Cannon, King v. Burwell and the Triumph of Selective
Contextualism, 2015 CATO S. CT. REV 35, 48–50; Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher
J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax Lawyer, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 39–46.
18 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2489 (quoting Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA, 134
S. Ct. 2427, 2444 (2014).
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breadth of delegation to presume, as Justice Scalia colorfully put it, that
Congress “does not . . . hide elephants in mouseholes.”19
Legislative responses to nondelegation concerns have also largely
focused on addressing the breadth of statutory delegations to federal
agencies and federal agencies’ authority to address questions of deep
political and economic significance. One obvious example is the
Congressional Review Act (CRA), which allows Congress to invalidate a
major agency rule with only a simple majority in both chambers (and
presidential approval).20 The CRA has played a major role in the Trump
Administration, with Congress having invalidated fourteen major agency
rules that were promulgated at the end of the Obama Administration.21
The proposed Regulations of the Executive in Need of Scrutiny (REINS)
Act would take the CRA one step further by requiring congressional action
before any “major” agency rule went into effect.22 Congress has also, at
times, used the appropriations process to constrain prior delegations of
regulatory authority, such as through substantive appropriations riders.
Such interventions are a blunt tool, however, and are more able to prevent
regulatory action than to expand or update prior grants of regulatory
authority.
Absent from these attempts to address nondelegation is any focus on
the temporal problems of congressional delegation. Specifically, broad
congressional delegations of authority at one time period become a source
of authority for agencies to take later action that could no longer receive
legislative support or that was not adequately contemplated, let alone

19 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001) (per Scalia, J.);
see also Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62
ADMIN. L. REV. 19 (2010) (reviewing literature and providing summary of
doctrinal development).
20 See generally Note, The Mysteries of the Congressional Review Act, 122
HARV. L. REV. 2162, 2162–64 (2009).
21 See GEO. WASH. U. REG. STUD. CTR., CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT—115TH
CONGRESS (last updated June 1, 2018), https://regulatorystudies.columbian
.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs1866/f/downloads/CRA%20Tracker%205-23-18.pdf;
In addition, Congress also used the CRA to invalidate two regulations
promulgated by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) after
President Trump assumed office. See infra notes __, and accompanying text.
22 H.R. 26, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017) (defining “major rule” as one that the Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs has deemed would result in “(1) an annual
cost on the economy of $100 million or more (adjusted annually for inflation); (2)
a major increase in costs or prices for consumers, individual industries, federal,
state, or local government agencies, or geographic regions; or (3) significant
adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity,
innovation, or the ability of U.S.-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based
enterprises”). See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Placing “REINS” on Regulations:
Assessing the Proposed REINS Act, 16 NYU J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2013); see also
Jonathan R. Siegel, The REINS Act and the Struggle to Control Agency
Rulemaking, 16 NYU J. LEG. & PUB. POL’Y 131 (2013).
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considered, at the time of enactment.23 This problem has taken on added
significance with the fall of lawmaking by legislation and the rise of
lawmaking by regulation.24 Congressional inaction has exacerbated the
problems of open-ended, broad statutory delegations. Even when the
existing statutory schemes fail or reach their limits, Congress rarely
acts.25 Without regular legislative activity, agencies are forced to get more
creative with stale statutory mandates to address new problems and
changed circumstances.26 What little legislative activity occurs often
comes in reactive spurts, triggered by apparent emergencies or crises.
This dynamic encourages Congress to delegate broad authority before
focusing on an appropriate regulatory response.27
To be sure, even without regular legislative activity, Congress retains
some powerful tools to oversee agencies and shape regulatory activities.28
But federal agencies may come to view such congressional oversight as
just the cost of doing business, not a meaningful constraint on regulatory
activity.
To address this distinct, time problem of delegation, Congress should
return to passing laws on a regular basis. And, in particular, Congress
should revive the practice of regular reauthorization of statutes that
govern federal regulatory action. This legislative engagement would
include regular assessment of agency action and regular recalibration if
the agency’s regulatory activities are inconsistent with the current
Congress’s policy objectives. In some regulatory contexts, this may require
Congress to consider adding reauthorization incentives, such as sun23 See Michael S. Greve & Ashley C. Parrish, Administrative Law Without

Congress, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 501, 502 (2015) (noting Congress “consistently
fails to update or revise old statutes even when those statutes are manifestly
outdated or, as actually administered, have assumed contours that the original
Congress never contemplated and the current Congress would not countenance”).
24 See, e.g., Christopher J. Walker, Inside Agency Statutory Interpretation, 67
STAN. L. REV. 999, 1000 (2015) (observing that “the focus and function of
lawmaking have shifted from judge-made common law, to congressionally enacted
statutes, and now to agency-promulgated regulations”).
25 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Regulating in the Dark, in REGULATORY
BREAKDOWN: THE CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN U.S. REGULATION 86, 87 (Cary
Coglianese ed. 2012) (“Congress tends not to move nimbly to rework financial
legislation when it becomes widely acknowledged as flawed or seriously
deficient”); Phillip Wallach, Congress Indispensable, NAT’L AFF., Winter 2018,
https://www.nationalaffairs.com/publications/detail/congress-indispensable
(“Congress is a mess. It seems incapable of passing major legislation”).
26 See, e.g., Greve & Parrish, supra note 23; Jody Freeman & David B. Spence,
Old Statutes, New Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014); Philip Wallach, When
Can You Teach an Old Law New Tricks?, 16 NYU J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 689 (2013).
27 See Romano, supra note 25, at 90 (“[D]elegation enables legislators to ‘do
something’ in a crisis, by passing ‘something’ and thereby mollifying media and
popular concerns, while at the same time shifting responsibility to an agency for
potential policy failures.”).
28 See generally JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION, LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2017).
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setting provisions or so-called “hammer” provisions designed to induce
legislative engagement. In others, Congress may decide the costs of
mandatory reauthorization outweigh the benefits. Nevertheless,
Congress should more regularly use this longstanding legislative tool to
mitigate the democratic deficits that come with broad delegations of
lawmaking authority to federal agencies.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I surveys the nondelegation
doctrine debate and how that doctrine addresses the democratic deficits
in lawmaking by regulation. Part II examines the judicial and legislative
responses to nondelegation, emphasizing how they primarily address the
scope of open-ended congressional delegation, not the temporal aspect.
Part III turns to the temporal problems with excessive delegation. Part
III.A develops the theoretical case for regular reauthorization to address
the temporal aspects of delegation’s democratic deficits. Part III.B
examines the history of reauthorization practices in Congress, surveying
the breadth of such practices before providing a snapshot of eight current
reauthorization efforts—including reauthorization of three agencies
(Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Export-Import Bank, and
Federal Aviation Administration) and five federal programs (FDA userfees programs, the Farm Bill, No Child Left Behind, PATRIOT Act, and
Pipeline Safety Act). Part IV fleshes out how Congress could use
reauthorization as a legislative tool to advance democratic values. It
examines the mechanisms that could encourage a regular reauthorization
process and responds to potential objections. The Article concludes with a
few thoughts on how a regular reauthorization process would strengthen
the partnership between Congress and the administrative state, while
affecting judicial review in terms of both Chevron deference29 and
statutory stare decisis.

I. NONDELEGATION AND CONGRESSIONAL INACTION
Delegation lies at the foundation for the modern administrative
state.30 Federal administrative agencies have no inherent power to issue
regulations, administer programs, or enforce federal law. Rather, through
legislation Congress grants agencies that power to act.31 In various

29 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.

837, 842–43 (1984).
30 See Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword—1930s Redux: The Administrative State
Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (2017) (noting “broad delegations of authority
to the executive branch . . . represent the central reality of contemporary national
government”); id. at 24 (“Broad delegations of policymaking power represent the
backbone of the modern administrative state”).
31 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (“It is
axiomatic that an administrative agency’s power to promulgate legislative
regulations is limited to the authority delegated by Congress.”); see also La. Pub.
Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986) (“[A]n agency literally has no
power to act . . . unless and until Congress confers power upon it.”); see also
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statutes, Congress has granted agencies the authority to implement—and
oftentimes direct—federal policy across a wide range of policy areas, and
this practice of delegation has increased over time.32
Congress often has good reasons to delegate substantial policymaking
and implementation to administrative agencies.33 Some would say broad
delegation is “necessary.”34 Legislators, even those with longstanding
service on relevant committees, tend to lack the same degree of subjectspecific expertise as do administrative agencies. The same is true for
legislative staff. Agencies may also be free of some of the temporal and
political constraints faced by elected officials, particularly members of the
House of Representatives who need to stand for reelection every two
years.35 It may also be easier to develop coherent policies on complex or
controversial matters within a hierarchical structure than in a legislative
committee.36 Agencies may also be able to act with greater speed and
dispatch than a bicameral legislature, making them more suited to
address urgent problems.
Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to
Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2101 (2004).
32 See, e.g., Edward H. Stiglitz, The Limits of Judicial Control and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 34 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 27, 39 (2018) (noting empirical
support for claim that “the quantity of delegations increased dramatically during
the New Deal”). For histories of the growth of the regulatory state tailing the
increase in delegation, particularly in the 1960s and 1970s, see W ILLIAM F. WEST,
ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 16–31 (1985); CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING
8–20 (3d ed. 2003); MARC ALLEN EISNER, JEFF WORSHAM & EVAN J. RINGQUIST,
CONTEMPORARY REGULATORY POLICY 35–44 (1999). This expansion in delegation
has been “a bipartisan enterprise.” Christopher DeMuth, The Regulatory State,
NAT’L AFF., Summer 2012, at 70; see also Over-regulated America, THE
ECONOMIST, Feb. 18, 2012, at 9, 9 (“Governments of both parties keep adding
stacks of rules, few of which are ever rescinded.”).
33 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (noting that “in
our increasingly complex society, . . . Congress simply cannot do its job absent an
ability to delegate power under broad general directives”); see also Jerry L.
Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81 (1985).
34 See, e.g., Metzger, supra note 30, at 7 (claiming broad “delegations are
necessary given the economic, social, scientific, and technological realities of our
day”).
35 See, e.g., DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 133–34 (2000) (“Congress can delegate its legislative
authority to the agencies at its discretion for a wide variety of reasons: to alleviate
its workload; to avoid a particularly nettlesome political issue; to focus highly
specialized administrative expertise on a particular problem; for convenience; or
simply because the agencies do not face the constraints of a legislature that is
reconstituted every two years.”). For additional arguments in support of
delegation, see Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative
Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975); JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESS (1938).
36 See DeMuth, supra note 32, at 72 (“A hierarchy can make decisions with
much greater dispatch than a committee can.”).
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However necessary the practice of delegation, it is not without its
costs, including a potential loss of democratic accountability.37 Concerns
about delegation motivate much contemporary criticism of the
administrative state. To some critics, the widespread delegation of
regulatory and other power to federal agencies represents an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.38 To others, widespread
delegation represents Congress’s shirking of its fundamental
responsibilities and undermines the democratic legitimacy of regulatory
policy.39 As John Hart Ely observed, the concern with delegation is not
necessarily that “‘faceless bureaucrats’ necessarily do a bad job as our
effective legislators.” Rather, it is that “[t]hey are neither elected nor
reelected, and are controlled only spasmodically by officials who are.”40 In
this way, broad delegation can be viewed as a threat to deliberative
democracy.41
Then-Professor Elena Kagan observed that delegation enables
Congress to pass the buck to the executive branch,42 even though it may
increase the power and influence of individual legislators.43 Other
37 See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS

ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 109–11 (1993); Neomi Rao,
Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective Congress, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1465 (“The Constitution separates lawmaking from law
execution to promote accountability and the rule of law, and thereby safeguard
individual liberty.”). Similar accountability concerns arise when agencies attempt
to fix errors in the statutes they are charged with implementing. See, e.g., Leigh
Osofsky, Agency Legislative Fixes, 105 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming 2020),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3448468.
38 See, e.g., PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LAWFUL? (2014);
Gary Lawson, Discretion as Delegation: The “Proper” Understanding of the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 235 (2005); Gary Lawson,
Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327 (2002); Michael B.
Rappaport, The Selective Nondelegation Doctrine and the Line Item Veto: A New
Approach to the Nondelegation Doctrine and Its Implications for Clinton v. City
of New York, 76 TUL. L. REV. 265 (2001); SCHOENBROD, supra note 37.
39 See Lawson, supra note 38, at 332 (“The delegation phenomenon raises
fundamental questions about democracy, accountability, and the enterprise of
American government.”).
40 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
131 (1980); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2347 (2001) (“Congress rarely is held accountable for agency
decisions . . . .”).
41 See Sunstein, supra note 15, at 7. Indeed, as John Hart Ely observed,
“[t]hat legislators often find it convenient to escape accountability is precisely the
reason for a non-delegation doctrine.” ELY, supra note 40, at 133.
42 See Kagan, supra note 40, at 40.
43 See Rao, supra note 37 (explaining how delegation may create
opportunities for individual legislators to “collude” with agencies or influence
regulatory policy through oversight, appropriations, and direct involvement with
agencies); see also Christopher J. Walker, Legislating in the Shadows, 165 U. PA.
L. REV. 1377, 1407–19 (2017) (exploring how the role of federal agencies in
statutory drafting may exacerbate the risks of administrative collusion). [perhaps
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Justices have identified broad delegation as a threat to individual
liberty.44 As Justice Gorsuch explained in his dissent in Gundy last Term,
“Some occasionally complain about Article I’s detailed and arduous
processes for new legislation, but to the framers these were bulwarks of
liberty.”45
Much criticism of unbridled delegation focuses on the volume, range,
and expansiveness of the legislature’s delegation of authority. Some
statutes grant federal agencies the authority to make broad policy
decisions with tremendous economic consequences, such as the acceptable
level of air pollution in urban areas46 or how to regulate emerging
telecommunications technologies.47 Others give agencies minimal
constraints on whether to adopt regulatory measures and what policy
objectives such measures should pursue.
While judges and academics have focused on the breadth and scope of
delegation, less attention has been paid to the time element of delegation.
Agencies using their delegated power are often drawing on statutory
authority granted many years (or decades) earlier. Yet agencies quite
often rely on long-standing—and even long-dormant—authority when
creating new regulations. This time dimension is largely absent from
delegation debates and discussions.
A few examples illustrate the importance of time. When the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) first sought to adopt an “open
internet” order, it relied on a 1934 statute that Congress had not
substantially revisited in fourteen years.48 Even with these revisions, the
statute was “woefully outdated” within a decade.49 The 1996 amendments
to the Communications Act preceded “Wi-Fi” networks, let alone
Facebook, Wikipedia, Netflix, or even Google. These amendments
expand to incorporate political science literature on committees, Congress, and
delegation]
44 See Dep’t of Transportation v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, __ (2015)
(Alito, J., concurring); id. at __ (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); see also
Metzger, supra note 30 at 23 (“Both justices expressed concern that delegations
make lawmaking too easy and threaten individual liberty.”); Rao, supra note 37,
at 1465 (“The Constitution separates lawmaking from law execution to promote
accountability and the rule of law, and thereby safeguard individual liberty.”).
45 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2134 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
46 See 42 U.S.C. §7409.
47 <insert citations>
48 See In re Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905 (2010), order
vacated in part, Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623 (D.C. Cir. 2014); see also U.S.
Telecom. Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc) (“[B]ecause Congress never passed net
neutrality legislation, the FCC relied on the 1934 Communications Act, as
amended in 1996, as its source of authority for the net neutrality rule.”).
49 See Randolph J. May, Why Stovepipe Regulation No Longer Works: An
Essay on the Need for a New Market-Oriented Communications Policy, 58 F ED.
COMM. L.J. 103, 103 (2006).
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responded to time-specific technologies and market pressures, and
presumed a desire for a “stovepipe” regulatory framework separating
telecommunications and information services.50 However appropriate
such ideas were in 1996, they are obsolete today.51 Yet the FCC draws its
authority to regulate internet service providers from this outdated
statute, with its outdated assumptions.
Environmental law is replete with statutes based on outdated or
mistaken assumptions that limit their effectiveness. In some cases, these
statutes relied on then-current scientific understandings of
environmental problems and their causes.52 Yet as scientific
understanding and technical expertise concerning pollution and other
environmental concerns have advanced, the statutory regimes have not
kept pace.53 Much of the Clean Water Act focuses on pollution from point
sources; relatively little of the Act concerns non-point sources. However
well-justified this emphasis may have been in 1972, it is obsolete today,
as nonpoint source pollution now presents the far greater threat to water
quality. Yet the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has been
delegated relatively little authority to address that.
The Clean Air Act (CAA) is arguably the most expansive federal
environmental law. It is also the source of authority for recent regulations
adopted to limit greenhouse gas emissions in an effort to reduce the threat
posed by global warming.54 Congress erected the basic architecture in
1970,55 and made significant modifications in 197756 and 1990.57 As
originally constructed, the CAA focused most acutely on localized air
pollution. The “centerpiece” of the Act defines acceptable ambient
concentrations of regulated air pollutants and direct states to adopt plans
to ensure compliance with the designated National Ambient Air Quality
50 See id. at 104.
51 See id. at 106–07 (“However serviceable these definitional constructs may

have been at an earlier time, . . . they are no longer serviceable in a world in which
digital technology is rapidly displacing analog.”).
52 See A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the
Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1121, 1122-23
(1994) (noting how much environmental law was based upon an equilibrium
paradigm that is no longer accepted by scientists); see also DANIEL B. BOTKIN, THE
MOON IN THE NAUTILUS SHELL: DISCORDANT HARMONIES RECONSIDERED ix (2013).
53 See Craig Anthony (Tony) Arnold & Lance H. Gunderson, Adaptive Law &
Resilience, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 10426, 10426 (2013) (“The foundational assumptions
of U.S. environmental law are questionable.”); BOTKIN, MOON, supra note __, at
6.
54 For a critical overview of the development of these regulations, see
Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of Greenhouse
Gas Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 421
(2011).
55 Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970).
56 Clean Air Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977).
57 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat. 2399.
The CAA’s express authorization expired in 1998.
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Standards (NAAQS).58 Relatively little of the CAA’s core architecture
concerned interstate air pollutants. Global climate change, in particular,
was not yet a serious concern within Congress.59
When Congress last modified the CAA in 1990, it tightened and
revised the NAAQS provisions.60 Congress also expanded the statute’s
scope to address non-localized air pollutants, such as those that contribute
to acid precipitation and the depletion of stratospheric ozone.61 Separate
provisions addressed each of these concerns. However, no provisions
expressly addressed greenhouse gas emissions.62 Nor have any such
measures been adopted since.63 Nonetheless, seventeen years later in
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Supreme Court concluded that the plain
language of the CAA was broad enough to cover greenhouse gases as air
pollutants.64 Whether the Court was correct to interpret the CAA in this
fashion,65 it is fair to say that Massachusetts v. EPA set in motion a series
of regulatory initiatives that Congress never contemplated,66 let alone
endorsed, and forced the EPA to retrofit a twentieth-century statutory
regime to address a twenty-first century problem.67
58 See, e.g., Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST.

LOUIS PUB. L. REV. 121, 121 (2001) (“The National Ambient Air Quality Standards
(NAAQS) form the centerpiece of what many consider to be this country's single
most important environmental program.”); see also Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 427
U.S. 246, 249 (1976) (characterizing provisions requiring state implementation
plans to meet NAAQS standards the “heart” of the CAA).
59 See Richard Lazarus, Environmental Law without Congress, 30 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 15, 30 (2014) (“Climate change is perhaps the quintessential
example of a new environmental problem that the Clean Air Act did not
contemplate.”); see also ARNOLD W. REITZE, JR., AIR POLLUTION CONTROL LAW:
COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 419 (2001).
60 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–549, 104 Stat.
2399.
61 Id.
62 This was not for a lack of trying, however, as Congress did consider
whether to grant the EPA regulatory authority over greenhouse gases. See S. REP.
No. 101-228, at 439 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3819 (discussing
provisions contained in proposed Senate amendments to the CAA that would have
authorized EPA to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles)
63 See Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., If Carbon Dioxide Is a Pollutant, What Is EPA to
Do?, in RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE (Rocky Mtn. Min. L.
Found. 2008) (“Since 1999 more than 200 bills were introduced in Congress to
regulate [greenhouse gases], but none were enacted.”).
64 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
65 One of us is on record arguing that the Court was incorrect in
Massachusetts v. EPA. See Jonathan H. Adler, Warming Up to Climate Change
Litigation, 3 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 61 (2007).
66 See Jonathan H. Adler, Heat Expands All Things: The Proliferation of
Greenhouse Gas Regulation under the Obama Administration, 34 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 421 (2011).
67 This disjunction is readily evident in Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,
134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014), in which the Court struggled to reconcile the CAA’s text
with the obligation to regulate greenhouse gases as air pollutants.
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This temporal problem is not limited to regulatory programs. Older
extant statutes often enable the executive branch to take actions Congress
did not anticipate. For instance, Congress enacted the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act in 1977 (IEEPA) to empower the
President to take concrete actions in response to any “unusual and
extraordinary threat . . . to the national security, foreign policy, or
economy of the United States” arising from outside the country.68 This
statute grants broad authority that has been invoked to address a wide
range of foreign policy concerns.69 While Congress did not seek to
delineate the precise circumstances under which the IEEPA could be
used, it is quite unlikely the 1977 Congress intended to delegate authority
to impose tariffs on Mexico in response to an alleged illegal migration
crisis.70 Yet that is how it was used in 2019.71
The temporal lag between legislative delegation and utilization of
delegated authority raises distinct concerns about whether delegation is
consistent with democratic governance. As already noted, agencies only
have that power delegated to them by Congress.72 Thus, when an agency
exercises such power, we may assume this is democratically legitimate
because the political branches authorized it, satisfying the requirements
of bicameralism and presentment. Yet when decades pass between the
enactment of statutes delegating authority to agencies and the exercise of
that authority, there is a risk that the delegated authority will be used for
purposes or concerns that the enacting Congress never considered. This
may lead to situations where Congress has not provided the proper tool
for the problem the agency is addressing.73 More broadly, agencies may
be exercising power granted for one purpose to pursue another aim that
Congress had never contemplated. This was arguably true with both the
68 See 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a).
69 See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (upholding broad

authority under the IEEPA to resolve diplomatic and financial disputes with
Iran). For a brief overview of the IEEPA, see Stephanie Zable, What Comes After
Tariffs:
An
IEEPA
Primer,
LAWFARE
(July
19,
2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-comes-after-tariffs-ieepa-primer.
70 See Statement from the President Regarding Emergency Measures to
Address the Border Crisis” (May 30, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-regarding-emergency-measures-addressborder-crisis/.
71 See Scott R. Anderson & Kathleen Claussen, The Legal Authority Behind
Trump’s
New
Tariffs
on
Mexico,
LAWFARE
(June
3,
2019),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/legal-authority-behind-trumps-new-tariffs-mexico.
72 See infra notes __ and accompanying text.
73 See Greve & Parrish, supra note 23, at 502 (noting the “old statute”
problem); Freeman & Spence, supra note 26 (same); see also Lazarus, supra note
59, at 29 (noting that in environmental law “statutory language, drafted years
ago, often does not fit with . . . new problems”); David Schoenbrod, How REINS
Would Improve Environmental Protection, 21 DUKE ENVTL L. & POL’Y F. 347, 347
(2011) (noting that “statutes that empower the agencies are increasingly
obsolete”).
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FCC’s initial effort to impose “net neutrality” and the EPA’s use of the
CAA to address climate change.
When agencies rely on regulatory authority delegated to them in the
past, there is also a risk that the power exercised is no longer in line with
contemporary legislative majorities. The inertia inherent in the
legislative process makes it difficult to revise delegations of authority and
can entrench the dead hand of a past Congress.74 Consequently, agencies
may often have the power (or even the obligation) to act based upon a prior
Congress’s preferences that no longer command popular support. In this
respect, the lag between delegation and regulation may create a
particularly concerning democratic deficit. The values ascendant at the
time of enactment may no longer command widespread support.
Particular policy concerns, much like given statutory language, may be
obsolete.
The problem of temporal lag appears to be worsening.75 Yet the
particular concerns for democratic legitimacy engendered by this
temporal lag are important but under-explored in the relevant literature.
As detailed in Part II, moreover, these concerns have not received
significant attention from either the courts or Congress in the form of
efforts to curb, constrain, or control delegated regulatory authority.

II. CONVENTIONAL RESPONSES TO NONDELEGATION
A.

Delegation in the Courts

Time and again the Supreme Court has proclaimed that Article I,
section 1 of the Constitution vests “all legislative powers” in Congress,
and that such power may not be delegated to other branches.76 Yet this
principle has not prevented Congress from delegating substantial
74 See

Rui J.P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Electoral Competition, Political
Uncertainty, and Policy Insulation, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 322 (2002)
(“Because of the multiplicity of veto points in the legislative process under a
separation of powers system, new laws are extremely difficult to pass, for a
minority can block new legislation.”); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 720 (1992)
(discussing phenomenon of “vetogates”).
75 See Suzanne Mettler, The Policyscape and the Challenges of Contemporary
Politics to Policy Maintenance, 14 PERSP. ON POL. 369, 379-82 (2016)(noting that
frequency of legislative updating or reauthorizing of major statutes appears to
have slowed in last few decades).
76 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (“Article I,
§ 1, of the Constitution vests ‘all legislative powers herein granted . . . in a
Congress of the United States.’ This text permits no delegation of those powers.”);
Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (“That congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the president is a principle universally recognized as vital to
the integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
constitution.”); Rao, supra note 37, at 1468 (“The Supreme Court consistently
affirms the importance of the nondelegation principle to the constitutional
structure.”).
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policymaking authority to administrative agencies, including the
authority to promulgate prescriptive regulations.77 Rather, as long
understood and applied by the Supreme Court, the non-delegation
doctrine merely requires Congress to articulate an “intelligible principle”
to guide an agency’s exercise of delegated power.78
In principle, this doctrine ensures that Congress remains responsible
for the major policy judgments that drive regulatory decisions.79 In
practice, the “intelligible principle” requirement has not done much to
constrain delegation to administrative agencies. While Congress may not
grant an administrative agency a “blank check” to do anything and
everything, virtually anything short of that will do.80 The Supreme Court
has found an “intelligible principle” in statutes authorizing federal
agencies to set “generally fair and equitable” prices81 and to regulate in
the “public interest.”82 As Justice Scalia summarized, the Court has
“almost never felt qualified to second-guess Congress regarding the
permissible degree of policy judgment that can be left to those executing
or applying the law.”83 To the contrary, in the nation’s history the
Supreme Court has only invalidated two (or maybe three) statutes on nondelegation grounds; both decisions were handed down way back in the

77 According to Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, this is evidence that

“[t]here just is no constitutional delegation rule, nor has there ever been.” Eric A.
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1721, 1722 (2002). Under this view, the only unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power would be if Congress sought to delegate the power to vote on
legislation or engage in other legislative acts. “A statutory grant of authority to
the executive isn’t a transfer of legislative power, but an exercise of legislative
power.” Id.at 1723.
78 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472; see also J.W. Hampton Jr., & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (holding that delegation is permissible provided
that “Congress . . . lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle” to guide
the agency).
79 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 757 (1996) (“[T]he delegation
doctrine [was] developed to prevent Congress from forsaking its duties.”); see also
Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 685 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., concurring) (the doctrine ensures “that important choices of social policy are
made by Congress, the branch of our Government most responsive to the popular
will”).
80 See, e.g., Merrill, supra note 31, at 2099 (noting that Congress only may
not grant “something approaching blank-check legislative rulemaking
authority”).
81 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 420, 426 (1944).
82 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943).
83 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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1930s.84 Thus, it can be said, “the nondelegation doctrine has had only one
good year and over two hundred bad ones.”85
While the nondelegation doctrine has not led to the invalidation of
federal statutes, nondelegation concerns appear to have influenced
various administrative law doctrines.86 Most notably, nondelegation
concerns appear to have influenced how the Court interprets statutes that
may be understood to delegate authority to regulatory agencies. In
particular, under various common canons of construction, courts are not
to lightly presume that Congress has delegated authority to agencies that
might implicate constitutional concerns, such as by intruding on state
prerogatives or infringing upon constitutional rights.87
Delegation concerns may also be observed in the Court’s application
and refinement of the rule announced in Chevron USA v. Natural
Resources Defense Council.88 Under the Chevron doctrine, courts are to
defer to agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions they
administer.89 This doctrine gives agencies the power to define the scope of
statutory prohibitions and determine whether given activities are subject
to various regulatory schemes. As a consequence, the Chevron doctrine
would seem to be the source of substantial agency authority, and some
have criticized the doctrine on just that basis.90
An unconstrained Chevron doctrine might raise substantial
delegation concerns. Yet, as refined by later decisions, the doctrine
actually accommodates nondelegation values. Most notably, Chevron
deference is only available where courts can conclude that Congress has
actually delegated such authority to the agency in question, albeit
implicitly or explicitly.91 As the Court explained just a few years after
Chevron, “[a] precondition to deference under Chevron is a congressional
84 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp v US, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co v Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). As discussed in note 7 supra, some may
view Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 311 (1936), as a third instance of a
successful nondelegation doctrine challenge.
85 Posner & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 1740 (citing Sunstein, supra note 15,
at 322); see also Christopher DeMuth, Can the Administrative State Be Tamed? 8
J. LEG. ANALYSIS 121, 128 (2016) (“nondelegation was a one-year, two-case
wonder”).
86 See generally Sunstein, supra note 15; see also John F. Manning, The
Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223; Cass R.
Sunstein, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1181
(2018).
87 Sunstein, supra note 15, at __.
88 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
89 Id. at 842-43.
90 See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 38.
91 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833, 855 (2001) (“A finding that there has been an appropriate congressional
delegation of power to the agency is critical under Chevron.”); see also Jonathan
H. Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW 983 (2016)
(discussing the delegation foundation of Chevron and the implications of this
approach).
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delegation of administrative authority.”92 This delegation is understood
to be connected to an underlying grant of policymaking and
implementation authority.93 Yet just as Congress cannot be presumed to
“hide elephants in mouseholes,”94 delegation must be demonstrated, not
merely presumed.
The so-called “major questions” doctrine provides a useful example of
how nondelegation concerns have influenced the Court’s approach to
Chevron. As Chief Justice Roberts explained in King v. Burwell, Chevron
“is premised on the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an
implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory
gaps.”95 Yet not just any gap will do. Where a proffered statutory
interpretation would seem to give an agency unnecessarily broad
authority, the Court has cautioned that Chevron may not apply.
Specifically, in cases such as FDA v. Brown & Williamson and King v.
Burwell, the Court has cautioned against deferring to agencies on
questions of major economic or political significance.96 The reason for this,
as the Court has explained, is that it would be extremely unlikely that
Congress would delegate the responsibility for resolving such questions to
administrative agencies.97 Indeed, Justice Gorsuch explained in his
dissent in Gundy last Term: “Although it is nominally a canon of statutory
construction, we apply the major questions doctrine in service of the
constitutional rule that Congress may not divest itself of its legislative
power by transferring that power to an executive agency.”98

92 See Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649 (1990); see also U.S. v.

Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). As Eskridge & Baer observe, “Mead
appears to have partially settled the debate within the Court about the conditions
for triggering Chevron deference . . . .” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E.
Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1123 (2008).
93 See Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (“A
premise of Chevron is that when Congress grants an agency the authority to
administer a statute by issuing regulations with the force of law, it presumes the
agency will use that authority to resolve ambiguities in the statutory scheme.”).
94 See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 4567, 468 (2001).
95 See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (quoting FDA v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U. S. 120, 159 (2000)).
96 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
97 Id. (holding that the availability of tax credits on exchanges established by
the federal government is “a question of deep economic and political significance
that is central to this statutory scheme; had Congress wished to assign that
question to an agency, it surely would have done so expressly”).
98 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2142 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting). Justice Gorsuch also suggested that the “void for vagueness” doctrine
is another tool the Court has developed to address nondelegation concerns,
illustrating how “[i]t’s easy to see, too, how most any challenge to a legislative
delegation can be reframed as a vagueness complaint.” Id.; see also Nathan A.
Sales & Jonathan H. Adler, The Rest Is Silence: Chevron Deference, Agency
Jurisdiction, and Statutory Silences, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1497, 1539-40 (2009)
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While the nondelegation doctrine itself is not used to invalidate the
delegation of such questions to federal administrative agencies, the socalled “major questions” doctrine ensures that broad and consequential
delegations are not merely assumed to have implicitly occurred due to a
statutory gap or ambiguity. Courts will only recognize such a delegation
where Congress has explicitly granted it. In this way, the “major
questions” doctrine helps protect against the potential loss of democratic
accountability resulting from unduly broad delegations.
However much the “major questions” doctrine may compensate for the
potential democratic deficit caused by delegation, it does little to address
the time concerns. The “major questions” doctrine focuses on the size and
nature of a delegation. It asks whether the matter in question is of major
economic and political significance, or whether it implicates matters
beyond the usual concerns and expertise of a given regulatory agency.99 It
does not, however, pay much (if any) attention to how long ago the
delegation occurred.

B.

Delegation in Congress

Congress has shown little interest in curbing delegation directly, thus
foregoing the benefits delegation may provide. Congress, however, has
considered, and even adopted, measures to address some of the
accountability concerns raised by expansive delegation or to otherwise
compensate for the loss of legislative control and political accountability
that expansive delegation may bring. Some of these measures address a
number of the democratic legitimacy concerns delegation’s critics have
raised. They do little, however, to address the specific temporal concerns
we have identified.

The Legislative Veto
The legislative veto was an early effort to constrain the potential
adverse consequences of expansive delegation.100 Between the 1930s and
1980s, Congress enacted dozens upon dozens of legislative veto provisions
within nearly 300 statutes.101 These provisions enabled Congress to
delegate broad legislative-like authority to administrative agencies while
(arguing that the delegation of some such major questions might raise
constitutional questions).
99 Thus, for example, the Court in King v. Burwell appeared to be concerned
not merely with the magnitude of the question of whether tax credits would be
available in federal exchanges, but also whether the Internal Revenue Service, in
particular, would be delegated the authority to address such a question. See King
v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2015) (“It is especially unlikely that Congress
would have delegated this decision to the IRS, which has no expertise in crafting
health insurance policy of this sort. . . . This is not a case for the IRS.” (internal
citation omitted)).
100 JAMES R. BOWERS, REGULATING THE REGULATORS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING 20 (1990).
101 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (noting the existence of nearly 300
legislative veto provisions) (internal citation omitted).
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retaining the unilateral authority to overturn administrative decisions
through legislative action absent presidential assent or a veto-proof
majority.102 The legislative veto also ensured that a later Congress would
retain that same ability, should it no longer support the agency’s
actions.103 In this way, the legislative veto addressed the time lag between
legislative authorizations and agency actions.104
Legislative vetoes, however, are no longer a permissible tool to rein in
delegation. In 1983, the Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha, invalidated the
legislative veto as incompatible with the Constitution’s requirement of
bicameralism and presentment for legislative action.105 Overturning an
administrative action constitutes a legislative act under the Constitution,
and is thus subject to the requirement of bicameralism and
presentment.106 A single chamber of Congress, acting alone, cannot
invalidate an action taken by a federal agency pursuant to an otherwise
lawful delegation of authority. That is because, the Chadha Court held,
Article I’s bicameralism and presentment clause “represents the Framers’
decision that the legislative power of the Federal government be exercised
in accord with a single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered,
procedure.”107
Although a unicameral legislative veto is unconstitutional, nothing
stops Congress from repealing or overturning regulations, either because
Congress prefers different policies or because it believes a given action is
improper. The threat of a presidential veto merely increases the vote
threshold for taking such actions. Traditional legislative procedures,
however, can stymie Congress, even when a majority supports
overturning an agency action. “veto gates” and other procedural hurdles
may stop Congress from enacting measures altering, redirecting, or
102 See id. at 974 (“[T]he Executive has . . . [generally] agreed to legislative

review as the price for a broad delegation of authority.”) (White, J., dissenting);
see also Michael Herz, The Legislative Veto in Times of Political Reversal: Chadha
and the 104th Congress, 14 CONST. COMMENT. 319, 324 (1997) (noting that the
legislative veto was developed “as a means for allowing massive concessions of
authority to the executive” by ensuring Congress would retain the ability to
review and control such delegations).
103 Cf. Harold H. Bruff & Ernest Gellhorn, Congressional Control of
Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369,
1371 (1977) (analyzing five case studies of the use of legislative vetoes to cabin
agency action and arguing against legislation that would make the legislative
veto generally available to Congress for any agency rulemaking).
104 There is also the issue of whether Congress would even take regular
advantage of a one-house veto. See, e.g., Michael Kaeding & Kevin M. Stack,
Legislative Scrutiny? The Political Economy and Practice of Legislative Vetoes in
the European Union, 53 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 1268 (2015) (finding little use
of a similar legislative veto mechanism by the European Parliament and Council
of Ministers).
105 Chadha, 462 U.S. 919
106 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3.
107 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
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rescinding authority previously delegated to an agency.108 Yet at the same
time Congress would be unable or unlikely to reenact the previously
delegated authority. After Chadha, Congress has more difficulty
controlling an agency’s actions.

The Congressional Review Act
Concerned that federal agencies may adopt regulations opposed by
current legislative majorities, Congress enacted the Congressional
Review Act of 1996 (CRA).109 The CRA created an expedited process for
considering joint resolutions to overturn regulations, making it easier for
Congress to reject agency actions of which it disapproves.110 In effect, the
CRA created a means through which Congress can police an agency’s
exercise of its delegated authority.111 While it remains difficult for
Congress to repeal prior grants of delegated authority, with the CRA
Congress can more easily overturn specific exercises of such power. This
modestly checks the temporal democratic deficit broad delegations may
produce, particularly during the transition between presidential
administrations.
But the CRA’s ability to address time concerns is limited. This is
because Congress can only use the CRA within a relatively short window
of time after the promulgation of a major regulation.112 Under the CRA,
before any new rule may take effect the agency must submit a report on
the rule to each house of Congress and the Comptroller General. 113 If the
regulation is deemed a “major rule”—defined as any rule that the White
House’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) concludes
will likely have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more,
or otherwise have significant effect on consumer prices or the
economy114—it may not take effect for at least sixty days after its
submission to Congress.115 This waiting period provides Congress with an
108 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge Jr., Vetogates and American Public Law, 31
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 756 (2012); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of
Legislative Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992).
109 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006).
110 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(B).
111 See generally, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Reawakening the Congressional Review
Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 187 (2018).
112 The window for congressional action may be extended by an agency’s
failure to comply with the CRA’s reporting requirements. Under the CRA, a new
rule is not to take effect until after the rule has been submitted to both houses of
Congress and the Comptroller General. See 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A). Agency
submission also starts the review period in which Congress may invoke the CRA’s
procedures to enact a resolution of disapproval. Were an agency to fail to submit
a newly promulgated regulation, as required by the CRA, Congress would appear
to retain the ability to revoke that regulation under the CRA. See Larkin, supra
note 111, at 214–15.
113 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).
114 5 U.S.C. § 804(2).
115 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(3)(A).
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opportunity to review major rules and consider whether to overturn them.
For this purpose, the CRA creates a streamlined procedure for Congress
to overturn a major regulation by enacting a joint resolution.116
Enacted in 1996, the CRA remained almost completely dormant for
its first two decades.117 Because the CRA resolutions are subject to
presidential veto, Congress’s only real opportunity to use the CRA is to
rescind “midnight regulations” adopted at the end of a presidential
administration.118 Consequently, prior to the election of President Trump,
the CRA was only used once to repeal a regulation: the ergonomics rule
adopted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration during
the Clinton Administration.119 And this regulation was only repealed
because it was created at the end of the Clinton Administration, allowing
a Republican Congress and the Bush Administration to use the CRA.
As the ergonomics rule illustrates, only those rules adopted near the
end of a President’s term are vulnerable to CRA repeal.120 This is because
a President is likely to veto any legislative effort to overturn a regulation
issued by his own administration.121 An outgoing administration can
protect regulations by ensuring new rules are not issued in the final
months of a presidential term. During the last year of the Bush
Administration, for example, agencies were instructed to finalize new
regulations early enough that they would not be subject to repeal under
the CRA during the next administration.122
116 5 U.S.C. § 802.
117 See
MORTON

ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30116,
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT OF
THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE 6 (2008) (noting through 2008,
joint resolutions of disapproval were introduced for fewer than five percent of the
regulatory actions to which the CRA procedure could be applied).
118 See generally MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RES. SERV., R42612, MIDNIGHT
RULEMAKING (2012); Susan E. Dudley, Reversing Midnight Regulations,
REGULATION, Spring 2001, at 9 [https://perma.cc/7MF2-HFVC].
119 Joint Resolution Providing for Congressional Disapproval of the Rule
Submitted by the Department of Labor Under Chapter 8 of Title 5, United States
Code, Relating to Ergonomics, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001).
120 Beyond revoking major rules of which Congress disapproves, the CRA can
also be used as a political tool to force a vote on potentially controversial
regulations, or even to force a presidential veto of a resolution of disapproval. So,
for example, Senate Democrats used the CRA to force the Senate to vote on a
Trump Administration regulation expanding the definition of short-term health
insurance plans and the FCC’s final rule rescinding the Open Internet Order, aka
“net neutrality.”
121 See Nick Smith, Restoration of Congressional Authority and Responsibility
over the Regulatory Process, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 323, 326 (1996); see also Herz,
supra note 85, at 323 (“Requiring presidential approval (or a two-thirds majority
to override) is hardly a formality.”).
122 See Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Chief of Staff, White House, to
Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (May 9, 2008), http://www.ombwatch.org/files/
regs/PDFs/BoltenMemo050908.pdf; see also Charlie Savage & Robert Pear,
Administration Moves to Avert Late Rules Rush, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2008, at A1
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Despite its early quiescence, Congress used the CRA extensively
during the first year of the Trump Administration.123 In 2017, Congress
enacted, and the President signed, fifteen resolutions of disapproval
revoking major regulations.124 Fourteen of these rules were “midnight
regulations” adopted during the closing months of the Obama
Administration. The fifteenth was a rule created in 2017 by the Consumer
Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). A sixteenth resolution of
disapproval—targeting another CFPB rule—was passed, and signed by
the President in 2018.125
While the CRA may be a useful tool to quickly roll back regulatory
measures adopted at the end of one administration, it remains a
particularly limited tool for restoring democratic accountability to
regulatory policy. The CRA makes it easier for Congress to rescind major
rules that are opposed by a contemporary legislative majority, provided
the White House agrees or there are enough votes to override a
Presidential veto. Even so, with the CRA Congress can better prevent
agencies from using prior delegations of authority to enact policies that
no longer enjoy political support.
The CRA also gives Congress a targeted means of rescinding prior
delegations of authority to regulatory agencies. This is because once a
resolution of disapproval is enacted, the rejected rule “may not be reissued
in substantially the same form” unless it is subsequently authorized by
Congress.126 In other words, a resolution of disapproval not only rescinds
a rule, it also rescinds the specific delegation of authority upon which the
agency relied.127

The REINS Act
Dissatisfied with the CRA’s limited potential to constrain major
agency actions that lack political support within Congress, some members
of Congress have considered reforms to strengthen the CRA. One such
(noting effect of memo would be to make it more difficult for new Administration
to reverse course).
123 See generally, Paul J. Larkin, Jr., The Trump Administration and the
Congressional Review Act, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 505 (2018); see also
Christopher J. Walker, Restoring Congress’s Role in the Modern Administrative
State, 116 MICH. L. REV. 1101, 1102 (2018) (“[O]utside of the tax reform legislation
enacted at the close of the year, Congress’s most significant legislative
achievement in 2017 may well not be a new law at all. Instead, it is arguably
Congress’s invocation of the Congressional Review Act . . . .”).
124 See Larkin, Trump and CRA, supra note 123, at 509.
125 Id.
126 See 5 U.S.C. § 801(b)(2).
127 The precise scope of the CRA’s limitation on the promulgation of rules on
related subject matter after the adoption of a resolution of disapproval has not
yet been tested. See Stephen Santulli, Use of the Congressional Review Act at the
Start of the Trump Administration: A Study of Two Vetoes, 86 GEO. WASH. UNIV.
L. REV. 1373 (2018) (discussing potential conflict over what constitutes a rule that
is “substantially the same” as one rescinded under the CRA).
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reform is the REINS Act—for “Regulations of the Executive in Need of
Scrutiny.” This legislation would require congressional authorization for
new major rules before they may take effect.128 Such resolutions of
approval would be subject to expedited consideration and streamlined
legislative procedures, much like resolutions of disapproval under the
CRA.129 The primary difference is that, while the CRA creates an
expedited process for the disapproval of major agency rules that would
otherwise become final regulations, REINS creates an expedited process
for the approval of major agency rules that is a precondition for final
promulgation, and effectively disables traditional means of obstruction or
delay. Specifically, whereas traditional legislation can be bottled up in
committee or held up by a determined legislative minority, resolutions of
approval under the REINS Act cannot be disposed of without a majority
vote.
The REINS Act would address delegation concerns, and the loss of
democratic accountability due to the passage of time, in much the same
way as a unicameral legislative veto.130 It would do this, in effect, by
rescinding prior delegations of authority to regulatory agencies, so as to
eliminate agency authority to promulgate major rules without legislative
approval. Instead, agencies would be required to submit “final” rules as
proposals for legislative action.
Adopting the REINS Act would make it much more difficult for
agencies to rely upon “old statutes” to adopt new policies without
legislative approval. In this regard, the REINS Act would begin to address
the problem of obsolete or outdated legislative authorizations. It would,
however, do this in a purely reactive manner, placing Congress only in the
position to reject agency actions. The REINS Act would do little to
encourage more proactive or forward-looking legislative engagement with
new, emerging, or changing circumstances that might justify federal
regulation. This reform would enable Congress to stop new regulatory
initiatives that lack sufficient democratic support, but would do nothing
to help facilitate a realignment of agency authority with contemporary
political preferences. So, for instance, the REINS Act would empower a
legislative majority to reject the proposed regulation of greenhouse gases
under provisions of the Clean Air Act enacted to address different types
of air pollution concerns, but could not be used to amend the statute or
128 For a discussion of the REINS Act, see Adler, supra note 22. For a less
favorable view, see Siegel, supra note 22.
129 Different versions of the REINS Act have been introduced. For a summary
and analysis of the precise legislative language introduced in 2011, see Adler,
supra note 22, at 21–24.
130 Then-Judge Stephen Breyer and Professor Laurence Tribe both suggested
that a congressional approval requirement, such as that proposed in the REINS
Act, would be a constitutional way of recreating the unicameral veto mechanism
invalidated in Chadha. See Stephen Breyer, The Legislative Veto After Chadha,
72 GEO. L.J. 785, 793–96 (1984); Laurence H. Tribe, The Legislative Veto Decision:
A Law by Any Other Name?, 21 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 19 (1984).
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create new sources of authority more functionally aligned with the threat
posed by the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.

Appropriations and Oversight
Even in the absence of judicial enforcement of the limits on delegation,
or legislative enactments to constrain the scope or duration of prior
delegations, Congress retains some ability to constrain and direct how
agencies use their delegated power. In particular, Congress may use
appropriations, the appointments process, and the oversight process to
discipline agencies. The function of delegation also provides individual
legislators, particularly those on the relevant appropriations committees,
with additional opportunities to influence agency behavior.131
In his recent book Congress’s Constitution, Josh Chafetz categorizes
Congress’s tools outside of regular legislation into six main powers: (1) the
power of the purse; (2) the personnel power; (3) contempt of Congress;
(4) freedom of speech or debate; (5) internal discipline; and (6) cameral
rules.132 This congressional toolbox provides Congress with substantial
power to monitor, constrain, and shape agency regulatory activity and
merit some attention here.
First and perhaps most importantly, there is Congress’s power of the
purse.133 While Congress does not regularly revisit past statutes
authorizing agency action, Congress still approves the annual
appropriations necessary to keep agencies operating. In the process,
Congress often enacts measures limiting or directing how agencies may
spend appropriated funds.134
The appropriations tool is particularly powerful because each
chamber of Congress has a veto on federal agency funding in the annual
budget process. The appropriations process, moreover, is not subject to
the same legislative procedures.135 Nor do the details of appropriations
bills receive as much public attention or debate as substantive
legislation.136 Indeed, the appropriations committees themselves rarely
have the same degree of policy expertise as those committees with
jurisdiction to enact substantive legislation in a given area. 137 Congress’s
131 See
132 See
133 See
134 See

Rao, supra note 37.
CHAFETZ, supra note 28.
id. at 45–77.
id. at 66–73; see also BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING:
NEW LEGISLATIVE PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 111–28 (2012) (explaining the
evolution of the appropriations and budget processes into a prominent and
“unorthodox” form of legislating).
135 See Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative
Democracy in Environmental Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 653 (2006) (“[T]he
appropriations process is procedurally distinct from the authorization process in
several significant respects. These differences, moreover, have significant
ramifications for the kind and substance of the laws that are produced.”).
136 Id.
137 Lazarus, supra note 136, at 654; accord CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, FEDERAL
AGENCIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS: TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN STATUTORY
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power of the purse, however, has weakened over the years. This is largely
due to the rise of mandatory spending not subject to annual
appropriations (69% of the 2016 fiscal year budget), the decline of the
House’s central appropriations role in the mid-1900s, and Congress’s
decision to grant some agencies fee-setting authority.138
The use of the appropriations process to limit agency action is no
substitute for affirmative legislation. Appropriations riders may prevent
agency departures from legislatively approved paths, but they cannot
wholly redirect regulatory programs. When Congress sought to complete
the Tellico Dam, continued appropriations were not enough to trump the
regulatory strictures of the Endangered Species Act.139 Legislative action
was required.140 Limiting appropriations is an effective way to limit an
agency’s exercise of delegated power, but it takes more than an
appropriation of federal funds to authorize agency action.
Nor does limiting appropriations permanently strip an agency of
delegated power. For instance, Republican Congresses in the 1990s
repeatedly passed appropriations riders prohibiting the EPA from taking
steps toward the regulation of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air
Act.141 While these measures were effective when adopted, they did not
eliminate whatever reservoir of authority the EPA retained under the
CAA. Prohibiting the EPA from regulating greenhouse gases would
require amending the underlying statute. Failure to renew the
appropriations riders freed the EPA to apply the CAA to greenhouse gas
emissions, but did not make it any easier to turn the decades-old statute
into an effective climate change policy instrument. Nor could more
climate-concerned congresses use appropriations to upgrade the CAA so
as to enable more effective climate policies.
Second, Congress has a potent personnel power. This consists of a
suite of tools that includes Congress’s role in appointing agency officials,
limitations on the president’s ability to use acting officers or recess
appointments, and Congress’s ability to remove officials in the other

DRAFTING 10–11, 38–39 (Admin. Conf. of U.S. ed. 2015); see also Adoption of
Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,162 (Dec. 16, 2015) (“Appropriations
legislation presents agencies with potential coordination problems as substantive
provisions or ‘riders’ may require technical drafting assistance, but agency
processes for reviewing appropriations legislation are channeled through agency
budget or finance offices. It is crucial for the budget office to communicate with
an agency’s legislative counsel office to anticipate and later address requests for
technical assistance related to appropriations bills.”).
138 See Walker, supra note 123, at 1108.
139 See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
140 The entire saga of the snail darter and the Tellico Dam is recounted in
Zygmunt Plater, Classic Lessons from A Little Fish in A Pork Barrel-Featuring
the Notorious Story of the Endangered Snail Darter and the TVA's Last Dam, 32
UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 211 (2012).
141 See Pub. L. No. 105-276, 112 Stat. 2461, 2496 (1998); Pub. L. No. 106-74,
113 Stat. 1047, 1080 (1999); Pub. L. No. 106-377, 114 Stat. 1441, 1441A-41 (2000).
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branches of government.142 These tools extend beyond approving the
president’s choice to run a federal agency. For instance, the Senate holds
a committee hearing on each nominee and can extract pledges from the
nominee about how she will run the agency, including commitments on
congressional oversight cooperation. Nominees often have one-on-one
meetings with senators, during which additional discussions about the
agency’s regulatory activities can take place. The Senate can withhold
consent, forcing the president to choose a nominee with a different
agenda. It can also delay consenting until the agency complies with
certain oversight requests or completes (or commits to complete) certain
regulatory activities. Alternatively, the Senate committee can refuse to
hold the nomination hearing at all.143
The final four tools in the congressional toolbox all relate to Congress’s
ability to conduct oversight of federal agencies. Congress’s Article I
cameral rules powers allow Congress to set up committees and to grant
certain investigatory powers, such as subpoena and hearing powers, to
those committees and subcommittees.144 These oversight powers are
enhanced by Congress’s power to hold Executive Branch officials in
contempt for failure to comply with congressional oversight inquiries.145
That members of Congress have an Article I freedom of speech and debate
also allows Congress to make public nonconfidential information from the
Executive Branch.146 Oftentimes the threat of public release alone
encourages federal agencies to comply with oversight requests, and can
even change agency behavior.147
Congress’s appropriations and oversight powers are important, and
can have a significant effect on how agencies exercise their delegated
powers. Indeed, it may be true that today “congressional oversight of
agency action is one of the most powerful tools that Congress has to
exercise some measure of control over administrative policymaking.”148
Yet the oversight power is inherently limited and, equally important, is
necessarily reactive. These tools can help constrain agency actions at odds
142 See
143 See
144 See
145 See
146 See

CHAFETZ, supra note 28, at 78–151.
Walker, supra note 123, at 1108–12.
CHAFETZ, supra note 28, at 267–301.
id. at 152–98.
id. at 201–31. Congress may still constrain the ability of individual
members of Congress to leak nonpublic information through Article I’s internal
disciple powers. See id. at 232–66.
147 See Walker, supra note 123, at 1112–13.
148 See Brian D. Feinstein, Designing Executive Agencies for Congressional
Influence, 69 ADMIN . L. REV. 259, 265 (2017); see also Alex Acs, Congress and
Administrative Policymaking: Identifying Congressional Veto Power, AM. J. POL.
SCI. (June 2019) (exploring empirically how Congress can use its oversight and
appropriations powers to exercise a legislative veto power over agency
policymaking); Brian D. Feinstein, Congress in the Administrative State, 95
WASH. U. L. REV. 1189 (2018) (exploring empirically how Congress utilizes its
oversight powers and how agencies actually respond to such oversight to avoid
further congressional scrutiny).
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with contemporary congressional preferences, but are ill suited to
effectively update obsolete statutory frameworks.149 Upgrading or
modernizing statues to ensure agencies have those powers necessary to
address contemporary concerns requires actual lawmaking.

III.

REAUTHORIZATION IN THEORY AND IN PRACTICE

Statutory frameworks need to be revisited if they are to be effective
and if they are to reflect contemporary preferences and present
understandings. Statutory obsolescence is a perpetual concern (or, at least
it should be). The problem of outdated statutory frameworks is
particularly acute for those authorizing complex regulatory programs
operating within ever-changing and evolving contexts. Congressional
failure to revise and reconsider the premises on which such programs are
based and the ways in which they operate inevitably undermines
democratic accountability and compromises effective governance.150
Either regulatory agencies learn to reinterpret and stretch their existing
authority, the underlying statutory framework becomes obsolete, or both.
The distinct temporal problem of broad delegation and related
concerns over statutory obsolescence would be addressed if Congress were
to return to the practice of enacting substantive legislation on a regular
basis. Yet this is easier said than done. Presumably, legislators would
legislate if that was their preference. That is, if members of Congress
believed the benefits of regular legislating outweighed the costs, then that
is how they would behave. For a variety of reasons, including competing
demands on legislators’ time and alternative ways to invest their political
capital, legislators choose not to legislate on a regular basis.
The surest way to change legislative behavior is to change the
incentives legislators face, and this is something self-conscious legislators
may seek to do. In a wide range of contexts, Congress already enacts laws
and adopts procedures with an eye toward altering or ameliorating the
incentives future legislators may face.151 If, as we argue, Congress does
not revisit and reevaluate existing statutory frameworks as often as it
should, Congress may be able to help solve this problem.
149 See Walker, supra note 123, at 1105 (arguing that lawmaking via
congressional oversight, as opposed to legislation via the collective Congress, risks
“administrative collusion” between individual members of Congress and
committees and the federal agencies being overseen); see also Rao, supra note 37,
at 1504 (“By fracturing the collective Congress and empowering individual
members, delegation also promotes collusion between members of Congress and
administrative agencies.”); Walker, supra note 43, at 1415–16 (exploring the
problem of “administrative collusion” with respect to the role of federal agencies
in the legislative process).
150 See Mettler, supra note 75, at 370 (“The lack of policy maintenance
undermines laws’ ability to achieve the purposes for which they were created.”);
id. at 375.
151 See generally, Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
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One way Congress may encourage future legislators to revisit existing
statutory frameworks on a more regular basis is through the use of
“temporary” legislation.152 Legislation that “sunsets,” expires, or
otherwise requires regular reauthorization could induce Congress to
revisit, reassess, and recalibrate existing programs, so as to ensure that
such programs reflect current knowledge, focus on the most salient
concerns, and are more in line with contemporary voter preferences.
Limiting the duration of legislative authorization can have broad
effects on the incentives faced by legislatures and the actions taken by
administrative agencies.153 Most obviously, limiting the duration of
legislation reduces the ability of legislative majorities to entrench their
policy preferences and benefits contemporary majorities relative to their
predecessors. In the context of regulatory programs, limiting legislative
duration tends to strengthen the hand of the legislature relative to the
executive.154 Regular reauthorization, where it occurs, is one way to help
keep agency authorizations current and responsive to changing
circumstances, evolving understandings, and shifting political coalitions.
Part III.A traces the history of temporary legislation in the United
States, whereas Part III.B examines the state of reauthorization today,
providing a number of snapshots of legislation that is reauthorized on a
regular basis.

A.

Temporary Legislation, Sunsets, and
Reauthorizations

The idea of temporary legislation is not new. “Temporary legislation,”
Jacob Gersen has observed, “is a staple of legislatures, both old and
modern.”155 Well before the birth of the modern regulatory agency,
prominent voices extolled the virtue of legislation that needs to be
renewed or revisited. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, argued that vices
such as corruption make statutory expiration preferable to relying on the
possibility of repeal.156 In Federalist No. 26, Alexander Hamilton argued
two-year limits on military appropriations would require periodic
deliberation and thereby check potentially unwise policy decisions.157
Temporary legislation was embraced by colonial legislatures and the early

152 See generally Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation, 74 U. CHI. L. REV.
247 (2007).
153 See id. at 248; see also Brian Baugus & Feler Bose, Sunset Legislation in
the States: Balancing the Legislature and the Executive 8–18 (Mercatus Research,
Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2015).
154 See Gersen, supra note 152, at 248.
155 Id. at 298. See generally FRANK FAGAN, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF
GOVERNMENT: TEMPORARY VERSUS PERMANENT LEGISLATION (2013).
156 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), reprinted
in 6 THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 3, 9 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1904).
157 Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist No. 26, 139 (ABA ed., 2009).
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Congress.158 The Sedition Act of 1798, as enacted, expired in 1801159 and
the first two national banks were created with time-limited charters and
allowed to expire as well.160
During the New Deal, when Congress set about creating a range of
new federal agencies, William Douglas urged consideration of limiting
how long Congress’s new creations could operate without renewed
legislative authorization. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court,
Douglas advised President Roosevelt to include sunset provisions due to
the risk that a new agency would have exhausted its “great creative work”
within a decade, and risked falling prey to “inertia” and becoming “a
prisoner of bureaucracy.”161 Sunset provisions, in Douglas’s view, limit
rent-seeking within the administrative state. Theodore Lowi echoed this
view in The End of Liberalism, in which he urged adoption of a “tenure of
statutes” act that would require statutes authorizing administrative
agencies to be periodically renewed.162 The idea was to require periodic
reevaluation and review of administrative agencies, so as to provide
opportunities to eliminate wasteful or unneeded programs, and bring
wayward bureaucracies to heel.
Interest in sunset provisions for administrative agencies peaked in
the 1970s, largely in reaction to widespread mistrust of government
institutions.163 Inspired by Lowi, Common Cause pushed for the adoption
of “sunset” clauses at the state level.164 Beginning in Colorado in 1976,
this movement quickly spread across the United States.165 Within five
years, sunset statutes of one sort or another had been adopted in thirtysix states.166 The details of these states varied from state to state, as did
the success of these measures.167 As a general matter, the various state
sunset laws required periodic review and reauthorization of state
agencies. Some required extensive (and costly) review and evaluation
prior to the sunset.168
158 See Gersen, supra note 152, at 252–53.
159 Sedition Act, ch. 74, §4, 1 Stat. 596, 597 (1798).
160 See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 (1791); Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch.

44, 3 Stat. 266 (1816).
161 See William O. Douglas, GO EAST, YOUNG MAN, THE EARLY YEARS: THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 297 (1974).
162 See THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF
THE UNITED STATES, 309-310 (2D ed. 1979).
163 See Mark B. Blickle, The National Sunset Movement, 9 SETON HALL LEGIS.
J. 209, 210-11 (1985); see also THAD HALL, AUTHORIZING POLICY (2004).
164 Id. at 212; see also Chris Mooney, A Short History of Sunsets, LEG. AFFAIRS,
Jan-Feb 2004.
165 See Blickle, supra note 163, at 217.
166 See Richard C. Kearney, Sunset: A Survey and Analysis of the State
Experience, 50 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 49, 49-50 (1990).
167 See Baugus & Bose, supra note 153.
168 See Blickle, supra note 163 at 228-29. In some cases, the cost of the periodic
review approached or exceeded the cost savings from the termination of
unnecessary programs. Id.

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3510688
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423062

30

WORKING DRAFT

[Dec. 2019

Proposals to adopt an across-the-board sunset provision, such as that
proposed by Lowi and (more recently) Philip Howard, have not gotten very
far169—though earlier this summer the state of Idaho apparently let its
entire regulatory code sunset.170 Yet temporary legislation or time-limited
authorization is common. The Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the USAPATRIOT Act are but two prominent examples of statutes initially
enacted with expiration dates; subsequent Congresses revised both
during reauthorization.171 Congress also enacts tax provisions on a timelimited basis, though this is often done to game the relevant budget rules.
In such cases, Congress limits the authorization of new programs when
unsure whether a given program or requirement will prove wise or to
encourage legislative reconsideration within a given period of time.
There are a host of arguments in favor of sunset provisions in organic
statutes. The most obvious—and one championed by now-Judge Guido
Calabresi in A Common Law for the Age of Statutes—is that sunset
provisions increase the likelihood of culling outdated laws, programs, and
agencies.172 Over time things change, and what was once necessary may
no longer be. In the alternative, an agency may remain necessary, but in
dire need of reform. Sunset provisions can serve as an effective oversight
tool when properly employed.173
Time-limiting statutory authorizations may also facilitate rapid
congressional response to apparent crises where there is a perceived need
for Congress to act quickly in response to urgent threats, but where
Congress may also lack the information necessary to develop the most
169 See Philip K. Howard, Starting Over with Regulation: Why Are Government

Rules so Complex? A Guide to a Radically Simpler System, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 3,
2011), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203833104577070403677
184174.html; see also PHILIP K. HOWARD, TRY COMMON SENSE: REPLACING THE
FAILED IDEOLOGIES OF RIGHT AND LEFT (2019).
170 See James Broughel, Idaho Repeals Its Regulatory Code, BRIDGE (May 9,
2019),
https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/idaho-repeals-itsregulatory-code. The Article I Restoration Act, if ever enacted, would sunset
certain new federal regulations promulgated through notice-and-comment
rulemaking after three years unless reauthorized by Congress. H.R. 3617, 116th
Cong. (2019).
171 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, et al., Showcase Panel IV: A Federal Sunset
Law, 16 TEX. REV. L. & POL.339, 353–58 (2012) (comments of William Eskridge)
(discussing the Voting Rights Act reauthorization history); John E. Finn, Sunset
Clauses and Democratic Deliberation: Assessing the Significance of Sunset
Provisions in Antiterrorism Legislation, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 442, 460–70
(2010) (detailing history of USA PATRIOT Act and its reauthorization). See also
Stephen I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: The Disturbing Prospect of
War Without End, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 53, 59 (2006) (arguing for mandatory
reauthorization for statutory Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)).
172 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982).
Compare Guido Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 VT. L.
REV. 247 (1979), with Jack Davies, A Response to Statutory Obsolescence: The
Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REV. 203 (1979).
173 See Blickle, supra note 163, at 228-230.
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appropriate response.174 As Roberto Romano notes, “sunsetting mitigates
the predicament of legislating with minimal information and therefore
running the risk of getting things seriously and, for all practical purposes,
permanently wrong.”175 If anything, Romano understates the value of
sunsets, in that even a purportedly well-informed Congress may be
misinformed or mistaken. The best understanding of many social
problems at the time of legislative action may prove to have been based
on faulty premises, erroneous analyses or limited information. Legislation
is never enacted with perfect knowledge, enhancing the value of
legislative procedures or norms that incentivize regular reengagement
with complex statutory regimes.
Being vested in certain instances with some form of legislative,
executive, and judicial powers, agencies pose a new and unique threat to
the separation of powers. Sunset provisions shift the burden of inertia
from those in favor of repeal, to those in favor of reauthorization. One
result of this is that—provided Congress does not blindly reauthorize an
agency—if the agency has drifted from its intended purpose, Congress can
modify its authorizing statute. Agency drift can thus be checked.176
For better or worse, the use of the sunset provision could also increase
the probability of an organic statute’s passage in the first place. Because
sunset provisions increase the probability that an agency or given
statutory provision will have a limited lifespan—or at least increase the
belief that the agency will have a limited lifespan—legislators may be
more willing to allow such measures to pass.177

174 See Romano, supra note 25, at 96.
175 Id.
176 See Baugus & Bose, supra note 153, at 13–18; see also George K. Yin,

Temporary-Effect Legislation, Political Accountability, and Fiscal Restraint, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 174, 182 (2009) (arguing that, in the context of tax and spending
legislation, “increased use of temporary-effect legislation enhances political
accountability and may lead to greater fiscal restraint”).
177 See Easterbrook et al., supra note 171, at 359 (comments of Frank
Easterbrook) (noting “possibility that the same reasons that make laws more
likely to expire under a general sunset regime— as the special prosecutor statute
eventually did under its statute-specific clause—make it easier to pass laws in
the first place”).
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Reauthorization Today

When we talk about reauthorization today, we are actually referring
to two distinct yet related concepts. First, there is temporary legislation:
enabling statutes that authorize a particular federal program or agency
to operate for a set time period.178 Second, there is the authorization of
appropriations, which, as the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has
explained, functions to
authorize the appropriation of funds (generally discretionary) to carry
out a program or function established in an enabling statute. An
authorization of appropriations constitutes guidance to the Congress
about the funding that may be necessary to implement an enabling
statute; it may be contained in that enabling statute or provided
separately. An authorization of appropriations may be annual,
multiyear, or permanent. Such an authorization also may be definite
or indefinite: It may authorize a specific amount or “such sums as may
be necessary.”179

As for the former, perhaps more classic version of reauthorization, there
is no federal repository that tracks and documents these various forms of
temporary legislation—though some scholars have explored specific
statutory contexts.180
As for the latter, however, Congress requires the CBO to prepare a
report each year that documents all federal programs and activities for
which authorization of appropriations has already expired prior to, or will
expire during, the fiscal year.181 For instance, in its March 2019 report,
CBO identified 971 expired statutory authorizations of appropriations
with more than $300 billion for which Congress had appropriated funding
for fiscal year 2019.182 Among the major sources of expired authorizations
that have nevertheless been funded are programs under the Veterans’
Health Care Eligibility Reform Act of 1996, Housing and Community
Development Act of 1992, and the Violence Against Women and
Department of Justice Reauthorization Act of 2005.183 As reported in its
searchable data supplement to the 2019 CBO report, nearly two dozen of
these 971 authorizations expired in the 1980s, including the Equal Access
178 Gersen, supra note 152, at 247 (“[T]emporary legislation merely sets a date
on which an agency, regulation, or statutory scheme will terminate unless
affirmative action satisfying the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and
presentment is taken by the legislature.”).
179 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, UNAUTHORIZED APPROPRIATIONS AND EXPIRING
AUTHORIZATIONS 2 (Mar. 2019) [hereinafter CBO REPORT], https://www.cbo.gov/
system/files/2019-03/55015-EEAA.pdf.
180 See Gersen, supra note 152, at 255–58 (providing examples and collecting
sources); Mettler, supra note 75, at 379–83.
181 Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93–344, § 202(e)(3). Copies
of these reports, dating back to January 2000, are available here:
https://www.cbo.gov/about/products/major-recurring-reports#13.
182 CBO REPORT, supra note 179, at 1.
183 Id. at 6 tbl.4.
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to Court Act as well as certain authorizations for the Federal Election
Commission, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and the
Department of Energy’s power marketing administration.184 The CBO,
however, does not even attempt to “identify whether an enabling statute
governing the relevant program or activity has expired.”185
The process of (re)authorization of appropriations should not be
confused with the appropriations process itself. These are separate
legislative processes that originate from distinct committees in
Congress.186 The authorization of appropriations generally goes through
the Senate and House subject-matter authorizing committees—the same
committees that conduct oversight and consider substantive legislation
relating to the particular subject matter, including creating new federal
agencies and programs, amending agency governing statutes, and
reauthorizing federal agencies and programs when general authorization
has expired.187 The CBO annual report breaks down the details of the
expiration of appropriations by authorizing committee. In the 2019 CBO
report, for instance, the Committees on Natural Resources (57 laws; 287
expired appropriations) and Energy and Commerce (49; 135) had the most
expired authorizations in the House, whereas the Committees on Health,
Education, Labor, and Pensions (40; 227) and Energy and Natural
Resources (20; 159) led the way in the Senate.188 As illustrated below in a
number of contexts, this (re)authorization of appropriations process often
leads to major substantive modifications of the organic statutes that
govern federal agencies and programs.
Appropriations legislation, by contrast, does not go through these
authorizing committees. Instead, the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations have exclusive jurisdiction over all discretionary spending

184 The

CBO’s searchable supplemental data file is available here:
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55015.
185 CBO REPORT, supra note 179, at 2.
186 See
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
APPROPRIATIONS LAW 2-54–2-56 (4th ed. 2016) [hereinafter GAO RED BOOK]
(differentiating
authorization,
authorization
of
appropriations,
and
appropriations),
https://www.gao.gov/legal/appropriations-law-decisions/redbook. For a classic account of the differences between authorization, authorization
of appropriations, and appropriations, see Louis Fisher, The AuthorizationAppropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal Practices, 29
CATH. U.L. REV. 51 (1979).
187 See GAO RED BOOK, supra note 186, at 2-55 (“Like organic legislation,
authorization legislation is considered and reported by the committees with
legislative jurisdiction over the particular subject matter, whereas appropriation
bills are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the appropriations committees.”);
CBO REPORT, supra note 179, at 2. See generally CHAFETZ, supra note 28, at 267–
301 (detailing how Congress has used its cameral rules powers to create standing
committee to legislate on specific subject matters and oversee the administrative
state).
188 See CBO REPORT, supra note 179, at 3–4 & tbls.1–2.
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legislation in each chamber.189 Appropriations committees have no
authority to authorize federal agencies and programs; indeed, they have
an obligation under chamber rules to expressly identify any federal
programs to be funded by proposed appropriations legislation that lack an
authorization.190 But in the modern Congress, as Barbara Sinclair, among
others, has chronicled, the appropriations and budget processes have
evolved into a new and predominant form of unorthodox substantive
lawmaking, through the insertion of substantive riders in appropriations
legislation that constrain agency action.191
Not only do different committees in Congress handle appropriations
and authorizations, but it is also generally the case that different officials
at the federal agencies handle appropriations (and budgeting) than those
who deal with Congress on a regular basis with respect to agency
oversight, substantive and technical statutory drafting, and the
reauthorization process.192 Indeed, the Administrative Conference of the
United States has identified this agency structure as problematic,
recommending that federal agencies “should strive to ensure that the
[agency] budget office and [agency] legislative counsel communicate so
that legislative counsel will be able to provide appropriate advice on
technical drafting of substantive provisions in appropriations
legislation.”193
If nearly one thousand federal programs lack reauthorization of
appropriation, how do they continue to operate? After all, since the 1800s,
both chambers of Congress have adopted rules that prohibit the
189 See CHAFETZ, supra note 28, at 45–77 (providing an overview of Congress’s

appropriations “power of the purse”).
190 CBO REPORT, supra note 179, at 2.
191 SINCLAIR, supra note 134, at 111–28; accord Jack M. Beermann,
Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84–91 (2006) (detailing
the use of appropriations riders to substantively constrain federal agency action);
Lazarus, supra note 136. See also GAO RED BOOK, supra note 186, at 2-59
(discussing how “despite the occasional comment to the contrary in judicial
decisions . . ., Congress can and does ‘legislate’ in appropriation acts”).
192 One of us documents and explores this agency organizational phenomenon
in CHRISTOPHER J. WALKER, FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS:
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN STATUTORY DRAFTING 30–31, 38–39, 48–89 (Admin.
Conf. U.S. ed., (2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2655901.
193 Adoption of Recommendations, 80 Fed. Reg. 78,161, 78,163 (Dec. 16, 2015);
see also id. at 78,162 (“Appropriations legislation presents agencies with potential
coordination problems as substantive provisions or ‘riders’ may require technical
drafting assistance, but agency processes for reviewing appropriations legislation
are channeled through agency budget or finance offices. It is crucial for the budget
office to communicate with an agency’s legislative counsel office to anticipate and
later address requests for technical assistance related to appropriations bills.
Agencies have taken a variety of approaches to address this issue, ranging from
tasking a staffer in an agency legislative counsel office with tracking
appropriations bills; to holding weekly meetings with budget, legislative affairs,
and legislative counsel staff; to emphasizing less informally that the offices
establish a strong working relationship.”).
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appropriation of funding for unauthorized or expired purposes.194 For
instance, current House rules detail that “[a]n appropriation may not be
reported . . . for an expenditure not previously authorized by law . . . .” 195
The Senate has a similar rule.196 To block unauthorized appropriations,
however, a point of order must be raised.197 Apparently these points of
order are never raised during the legislative proceedings. And, if they
were, the Speaker of the House and the Presiding Officer of the Senate,
respectively, would have to rule on whether the appropriation lacks
authorization.198
That many lapsed authorizations of appropriations are still funded
does not mean Congress never engages in reauthorization. The remainder
of this part details eight prominent reauthorizations that continue to take
place.
Farm Bill. Perhaps the most-known reauthorization legislation is
the Farm Bill. A product of the Great Depression,199 this omnibus bill
delegates a wide range of authority to the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA).200 Typically, the Farm Bill requires reauthorization every five
years.201 The most recent reauthorization occurred last year, in the form
of the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018.202 The Act includes some

194 See Walt Lukken, Reauthorization: Let the Debate Begin, 24 NO. 6 FUTURES

& DERIVATIVES L. REP. 1 (2004) (“Dating back to the 19th century, House and
Senate rules have generally banned appropriating monies for non-authorized
purposes and have subjected the legislation containing an unauthorized
appropriation to a procedural point of order on the House and Senate floors.”);
accord CBO REPORT, supra note , at 2 n.3. See generally JAMES V. SATURNO &
BRIAN T. YEH, CRS REPORT, AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS: PROCEDURAL AND
LEGAL ISSUES (Nov. 30, 2016).
195 H.R. Rule 21(2)(a)(1) (116th Cong., Jan. 11, 2019).
196 Senate Rule 16, https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate.
197 See, e.g., Lukken, supra note 194, n.3 (“Rule 21 of the House of
Representatives and Rule 16 of the Senate generally prohibit the inclusion of
unauthorized appropriations in appropriation and other legislation. However,
these rules are not self-enforcing. Members of each body must raise a point of
order at the appropriate time to enforce the rules. If a point of order is not raised,
the unauthorized appropriation will continue through the legislative process.”);
accord GAO RED BOOK, supra note 186, at 2-55–2-56.
198 See CBO REPORT, supra note 179, at 2 (“Whether an appropriation lacks
authorization and whether it is in violation of a House or Senate rule are
determined by the Speaker of the House or the Presiding Officer of the Senate on
the basis of advice from the relevant chamber’s Office of the Parliamentarian.”);
SATURNO & YEH, supra note 194, at 4–7 (detailing House and Senate procedures
for raising a point of order with respect to appropriation without authorization).
199 NORKIEWITZ & NITSHE, supra note 140, at 1.
200 National Institute of Food and Agriculture, The Farm Bill, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, https://nifa.usda.gov/farm-bill (last visited June
21, 2019).
201 NORKIEWITZ & NITSHE, supra note 140, at 1.
202 Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018, H.R. 2, 115th Cong. (2018).
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reforms203 and repeals,204 while reauthorizing many provisions by simply
amending their dates of expiration.205 For some provisions,
reauthorization came after expiration.206 Lately, such lapses are not
uncommon. For instance, the previous iteration of the Farm Bill, the
Agricultural Act of 2014, passed two years after the expiration of its
predecessor.207 In the interlude, Congress first partially extended the
2008 Farm Bill through an appropriations continuing resolution, then
extended the full Act in unaltered form through 2013.208
When Congress fails to reauthorize the Farm Bill, expiration has
various consequences. Discretionary provisions and the food stamps
SNAP program can be continued through appropriations bills.209 For most
mandatory provisions of a Farm Bill, however, expiration can halt new
activities and even cause operations to entirely cease.210 A long enough
expiration will lead to a “permanent law” reset.211 This means that all the
provisions and amendments that required reauthorization lose the force
of law, leaving in effect only the permanent provisions on which the
modern Farm Bill was built.212 This is a poison pill for all affected parties,
as the statutory and regulatory scheme essentially reverts back to that
dictated by the first Farm Bill, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.
This broadly undesirable default baseline appears to provide ample
incentive for the regular reauthorization of the Farm Bill.
Federal Aviation Administration. Last year Congress recently
reauthorized the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for five years.213
This reauthorization contains a mix of power reauthorizations and
appropriations reauthorizations.214 These reauthorizations occurred in a
somewhat similar way to the Farm Bill. Specifically, the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 simply amended the relevant subsections of
title 49 of the United States Code by striking “2018,” and inserting “2023”
into the text.215 Certain sections also amended the maximum authorized
appropriations for each given year.216

203
204
205
206
207

E.g., id. tit. VI, § 6503.
E.g., id. tit. II, § 2812.
E.g., id. tit. I, § 1402.
E.g., id. tit. I, § 1402(a) (amending 7 U.S.C. § 8772(e)(1) (2014)).
Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, H.R. 2419, 110th Cong.
(2008) (enacted) (preamble).
208 JIM MONKE, RANDY ALISON AUSSENBERG, MEGAN STUBBS, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., R42442, EXPIRATION AND EXTENSION OF THE 2009 FARM BILL 5-6 (2013).
209 Id. at 1, 3.
210 Id. at 3.
211 Id. at 3, 7.
212 Id. at 7.
213 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, H.R. 302, 115th Cong. div. B. tit. I (2018)
(enacted).
214 Compare id. div. B. tit. I, § 111(a), with id. div B. tit. I, § 111(b).
215 E.g., id. div. B. tit. I, § 111(b).
216 E.g., id. div. B. tit. I, § 113(a).
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And, like the Farm Bill, the FAA Reauthorization Act includes
substantive changes. Some changes seem minor, such as authorizing the
Secretary of Transportation to conduct a study assessing the future of
airport financing and infrastructure.217 Other changes, however, aim at
updating agency authority to address new technologies, including the
establishment of new conditions for recreational drone use.218 Other
legislative reforms, moreover, appear to respond to democratic wishes,
such as the reauthorization’s articulation of standards to improve
passenger experience on commercial airlines.219
No Child Left Behind. Unlike the Farm Bill or the FAA
reauthorization, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
(ESEA), as amended by the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, does not
contain any general authority sunset provisions; it is only constrained by
its limited appropriations authorization period.220 When Congress passed
the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, it amended ESEA by extending
various appropriations authorizations through 2007,221 while also
substantively modifying the ESEA, most notably by implementing
standardized tests as a means of assessing student development.222 But
when it came time to reauthorize appropriations, Congress failed to do so.
Therefore, in 2008, the ESEA received a one-year automatic extension of
the 2007 appropriation level pursuant the General Education Provisions
Act.223 After that, and without reauthorizing appropriations for ESEA,
Congress simply continued to provide the programs with funding through
appropriations legislation.224 Not until Congress passed the
comprehensive Every Student Succeeds Act of 2015, reauthorizing
appropriations through 2020, did these unauthorized appropriations
come to an end.225
217 Id. div. B. tit. I, § 122.
218 See Fed. Aviation Admin., FAA Reauthorization Bill Establishes New

Conditions for Recreational Use of Drones (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.faa.gov/
news/updates/?newsId=91844.
219 See Ashley Halsey III, Senate Gives Final Approval for FAA
Reauthorization, Sends Bill to White House, WASH. POST (Oct. 3, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/10/03/senate-gives-finalapproval-faa-reauthorization-sends-bill-white-house/?utm_term=.a6857e565732.
220 No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, H.R. 1, 107th Cong. (2001) (enacted).
221 Id. at tit. VIII, § 805.
222 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b) (2002).
223 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RL 33749, THE NO CHILD LEFT
BEHIND ACT: AN OVERVIEW OF REAUTHORIZATION ISSUES FOR THE 111TH CONGRESS
19 (2009).
224 Id.;
accord
CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH
SERVICE,
R44297,
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT:
HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EVERY STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 1 (2015).
225 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, R44297, REAUTHORIZATION OF THE
ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT: HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EVERY
STUDENT SUCCEEDS ACT 1 (2015); Every Student Succeeds Act, S. 1177, 114th
Cong. §§ 1002, 3002, 7013, 9106 (2015) (enacted).
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Pipeline Safety Act. Beginning with the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety
Act of 1968, Congress authorized the Secretary of Transportation to
regulate pipeline safety standards.226 While this authority has no sunset,
the Act only authorized appropriations for three years.227 Congress
routinely amends the appropriations authorization date, while also
periodically including substantive changes, most notably in the Pipeline
Safety Act of 1979,228 the Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988,229
and the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002.230 In 2004, Congress
also created the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration.231 This administration’s enabling statute likewise lacks
a sunset provision for its general authority, but also lacks an
appropriations authority sunset.232
FDA User-Fee Programs. The FDA user-fee programs exemplify
how regular reauthorization can run smoothly. Beginning in the 1990s,
Congress passed several Acts authorizing the FDA to implement user-fee
programs, which provide funds to improve the efficiency of relevant
operations.233 These programs must be and have been reauthorized every
five years.234 Most recently, with the FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017,
four of these user-fee programs were reauthorized into 2022 as a
collective.235 The Act also updated the enabling statutes for these and
other programs through clarifying revisions236 and some substantive
modifications.237 While none of the revisions appear to be comprehensive,
the routine reauthorizations keep these user-fee programs fine-tuned and
in good working order.238 Reauthorization occurs regularly because the
failure to reauthorize would revert the FDA drug approval process based
solely on congressional appropriations—wholly inadequate to timely
process drug approval requests—and would require the FDA to lay off
226 Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, S. 1166, 90th Cong. (1968)

(enacted) (preamble).
227 Id. at § 15.
228 Pipeline Safety Act of 1979, S. 411, 96th Cong. (1979) (enacted).
229 Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, H.R. 2266, 100th Cong.
(1988) (enacted).
230 Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002, H.R. 3609, 107th Cong. (2002)
(enacted).
231 49 U.S.C. § 108 (2004).
232 Id.
233 See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33914, THE PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER
FEE ACT: HISTORY THROUGH THE 2007 PDUFA IV REAUTHORIZATION 1 (2008).
234 E.g., 49 U.S.C. § 108 (2004).
235 FDA Reauthorization Act of 2017, H.R. 2430, 115th Cong. (2017) (enacted)
(preamble).
236 E.g., id. § 302(3).
237 E.g., id. § 203(f).
238 See, e.g., Amanda Rae Kronquist, The Prescription Drug User Fee Act:
History and Reauthorization Issues for 2012, BACKGROUNDER, at 3–5 (Dec. 21,
2011)
(summarizing
key
changes
with
each
reauthorization),
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/bg2634.pdf.
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agency officials whose salaries the user fees fund.239 The Government
Accounting Office reported that if the 1997 reauthorization did not occur,
the FDA would have to reduce its workforce by 700 full-time equivalents
for a total of 1,977 employees.240
Export-Import Bank. The Export-Import Bank (EXIM Bank) is
another agency requiring periodic reauthorization. The EXIM Bank first
became an independent agency at the close of the Second World War with
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945.241 The Act required and continues to
require periodic reauthorization.242 The most recent reauthorization
occurred in 2015 as part of the larger FAST Act.243 This reauthorization
actually came five months after the EXIM Bank’s authority lapsed, the
longest such lapse in the EXIM Bank’s history.244 In 2012, the EXIM Bank
had been reauthorized through 2014, and then into early 2015 with an
appropriations continuing resolution.245 When the EXIM Bank’s
authority lapsed for five months in 2015, it lost the ability to conduct new
business.246 However, the EXIM Bank could continue servicing incurred
assets and obligations.247 When it was eventually reauthorized through
September of 2019 as part of the FAST Act,248 the reauthorization came
alongside substantive reforms.249 For instance, the EXIM Bank is now
required to hold a five percent reserve ratio250 and appoint a chief risk
officer.251 This most recent reauthorization is yet another example of how
sunset provisions can lead to the continued modification and
modernization of federal agencies.
CFTC. The Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) is an
example of an agency that does not have a statutory sunset but has
required periodic reauthorization of appropriations.252 Congress created

239 See Letter from Bernice Steinhardt, Government Accountability Office, to

Sen. James Jeffords re PDUFA: Information About Reauthorization (July 21,
1996), https://www.gao.gov/assets/90/86843.pdf.
240 Id. at 1.
241 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, Full Historical Timeline, https://www.exim.gov/
about/history-exim/historical-timeline/full-historical-timeline (last visited June
21, 2019).
242 12 U.S.C. § 635f.
243 FAST Act, H.R. 22, 114th Cong. § 54001 (2015) (enacted).
244 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, supra note 217.
245 MARK THORUM, EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, OIG-EV-17-02, REPORT ON EXIM
BANK’S ACTIVITIES IN PREPARATION FOR AND DURING ITS LAPSE IN AUTHORIZATION
(2017) (executive summary).
246 Id.
247 12 U.S.C. § 635f.
248 Id.
249 FAST Act, H.R. 22, 114th Cong. § 51002 (2015) (enacted).
250 12 U.S.C. § 635e(b).
251 12 U.S.C. § 635a(l).
252 Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, H.R. 13113, 93rd
Cong. § 101 (1974) (enacted).
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the CFTC in 1974.253 Congress limited the CFTC by only authorizing
appropriations through 1978.254 The appropriations authorization has
been continually amended over time.255 And the CFTC has operated
without authorization of appropriations at least five times during its
almost half-century existence.256 Indeed, Congress has not reauthorized
appropriations for the CFTC since 2008; such authorization expired in
2013.257 Even so, Congress continues to appropriate funds to the CFTC
through appropriations bills.258
PATRIOT Act. The history of the Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (PATRIOT Act)
illustrates the versatility of sunset provisions. The PATRIOT Act was
born of chaos and tragedy. It was hastily signed into law in response to
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.259 The Act clothed the government with
immense authority to counter the terrorist threat.260 Perhaps due to the
emergency nature of the legislative response, Congress included a sunset
requirement for most of the statutory provisions concerning enhanced
surveillance.261 Those sections were set for a 2005 sunset.262
This sunset spurred Congress to debate the future of the PATRIOT
Act. The debate culminated in Congress passing numerous reforms.263 At
the same time, Congress repealed the sunset requirement for fourteen of
the sixteen previously covered sections and made those sections
permanent.264 A sunset was retained for amendments to the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which authorized “roving”

253 Id.
254 Id.
255 See 7 U.S.C. § 16(d).
256 See Lukken, supra note 194, n.4 (“The CFTC has operated without

authorization five times during its 30-year history: from September 30, 1982 to
January 11, 1983; from September 30, 1986 to November 10, 1986; from
September 30, 1989 to October 28, 1992; from September 30, 1994 to April 21,
1995; and from September 30, 2000 to December 21, 2000.”).
257 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (“There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as
are necessary to carry out this chapter for each of the fiscal years 2008 through
2013.”). See generally RENA S. MILLER, CRS REPORT, COMMODITY FUTURES
TRADING COMMISSION: PROPOSED REAUTHORIZATION IN THE 115TH CONGRESS
(Sept. 29. 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44733.pdf.
258 E.g., Consolidated Appropriations Act, H.J.Res.31, 116th Cong. div. C, tit.
V. (2019) (enacted).
259 See Brian Duignan, USA PATRIOT Act, BRITANNICA, (last visited June 25,
2019) https://www.britannica.com/topic/USA-PATRIOT-Act.
260 See id.
261 USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. § 224 (2001)
(enacted).
262 Id.
263 E.g., USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R.
3199, 109th Cong. § 108 (2005) (enacted).
264 Id. at § 102.
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surveillance and business records requests.265 Another section,
originating in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of
2004, also retained its sunset provision.266 Congress reauthorized these
sections until the end of 2009.267
By 2009, Democrats controlled Congress and the White House. When
it came time to address the expiring sections of the PATRIOT Act,
Congress failed to pass any comprehensive legislation.268 Instead, the
sections received one-year temporary extensions through a defense
appropriations bill.269 Then, with the PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of
2011—and without any substantive alteration—Congress extended their
sunset by “striking ‘May 27, 2011’ and inserting ‘June 1, 2015’.”270 Nearly
fourteen years after 9/11, Congress once again watched the sun begin to
set on the roving surveillance and business-records sections of the
PATRIOT Act. After allowing the sections to expire for one day,271
Congress passed the USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, the current law.272 The
Act extended the sunsets by roughly four-and-a-half years until December
of 2019.273 It also modified FISA substantially.274
* * *
These eight snapshots of regular reauthorization processes merit
more in-depth exploration, as they identify a number of best practices
could be adopted, and challenges that could be avoided, in reform efforts
to implement a more-ambitious reauthorization process in Congress. We
return to those implementation details in Part IV.

265 Id.; U.S. Department of Justice, FACT SHEET: USA PATRIOT ACT

IMPROVEMENT AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT OF 2005, OPA 06-113,
(March 2, 2006), https://www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2006/March/06_opa_
113.html.
266 USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, H.R. 3199,
109th Cong. § 103, (2005) (enacted).
267 Id.
268 Rachel L. Brand, Reauthorization of the USA PATRIOT Act, THE
FEDERALIST SOCIETY (Jan. 20, 2010), https://fedsoc.org/commentary/publications/
reauthorization-of-the-usa-patriot-act.
269 Id.
270 PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, S. 990, 112th Cong. § 1(a) (2011)
(enacted).
271 Jeremy Diamond, Patriot Act provisions have expired: what happens now?,
CNN (June 1, 2015), https://www-m.cnn.com/2015/05/30/politics/what-happensif-the-patriot-act-provisions-expire/index.html?r=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.
com%2F.
272 USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, H.R. 2048, 114th Cong. (2015) (enacted).
273 Id. § 705.
274 E.g., id. § 101(a)(3)(C).
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REAUTHORIZATION AS A TOOL TO ADVANCE
NONDELEGATION VALUES

As we have argued in this Article, the lack of legislative action with
respect to decades-old broad delegations of policymaking authority to the
regulatory state poses an overlooked, temporal delegation problem. As
detailed in Part I, the EPA’s attempt to regulate climate change and the
FCC’s attempt to regulate the internet provide vivid illustrations of this
problem: In both circumstances, the federal agencies have relied on
sources of authority granted by a prior Congress that never contemplated
the regulatory problem; and in both circumstances, the agencies may be
exercising that decades-old broad delegation in ways that a majority of
the current Congress may not prefer.
This temporal delegation problem, however, has taken on added
significance with the fall of lawmaking by legislation and the rise of
lawmaking by regulation. Although counting words, pages, and laws is by
no means a flawless method for capturing the extent of this trend in
federal lawmaking, it provides at least an imperfect snapshot. For
instance, by the end of 2016, the Code of Federal Regulations exceeded
175,000 pages, 100 million words, and tens of thousands of agency
rules.275 In 2016, federal agencies reached a new regulatory record by
filling over 95,000 pages of the Federal Register with adopted rules,
proposed rules, and notices—nearly 20% more than the 80,000 or so pages
published in 2015.276 Roughly two-fifths of those pages in 2016 were
devoted to 3,853 final rules, an increase from the 3,410 final rules federal
agencies promulgated in 2015.277 By contrast, the 114th Congress, over
that same two-year period, enacted just 329 public laws for a total of 3,036
pages in the Statutes at Large.278
275 See CLYDE WAYNE CREWS JR., COMPETITIVE ENTER. INST., TEN THOUSAND

COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 19,
20 fig.14 (2017), https://cei.org/sites/default/files/Ten%20Thousand%20Command
ments%202017.pdf (reporting the total pages at the end of 2016 as 185,053).
Apparently, it would take more than three years and three months for one
employed full time to read the entire Code of Federal Regulations. See Mercatus
Center, QuantGov Regulatory Clock, QUANTGOV, https://quantgov.org/charts/thequantgov-regulatory-clock/ (reporting 103,415,230 words and 1,084,666
regulatory restrictions in the Code as of October 3, 2018, with time based on
reading 250 words per minute in a full-time job).
276 CREWS, supra note 275, at 59 (reporting the total pages at the end of 2016
as 97,069, compared to 81,402 pages at the end of 2015). Of the 97,069 pages in
2016, 1,175 were blank. Id.
277 See id. at 17, 75. See generally MAEVE P. CAREY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R43056, COUNTING REGULATIONS: AN OVERVIEW OF RULEMAKING, TYPES OF
FEDERAL REGULATIONS, AND PAGES IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER 18 tbl.6 (2016)
(providing year-by-year statistics on the content of the Federal Register by pages
and actual numbers of proposed and final rules).
278 Compare Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114-1, 129 Stat. 3 (2015), with American Innovation and
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In other words, we live in an era when the vast majority of federal
lawmaking does not take place in Congress, but within the hundreds of
federal agencies spread across the modern regulatory state. And such
lawmaking is often taken under authority Congress delegated decades
before based on legislative compromises to address different problems.
One obvious, potential solution to this time problem of delegation would
be for Congress to legislate more regularly—especially to more jealously
guard the power it delegates to the President and the regulatory state.
Do not hold your breath that Congress will resume such legislative
activity on its own, at least not on a voluntary basis. Nor is exhortation
enough. The costs of regular legislative activity to members of Congress
apparently outweighs its benefits and the accompanying costs of dealing
with statutory obsolescence. But some form of temporary legislation or
mandatory reauthorization could help force Congress to take its
legislative role more seriously.
As detailed in Part III, the idea of temporary legislation or regular
reauthorization is not new. On the contrary, it even predates the
founding, with firm roots in the colonial era.279 Congress has used it over
the years in a variety of contexts, such as national security280 and
economic policy.281 Though, mandatory reauthorization requirements are
often ignored during the appropriations process.282
This Part explores how Congress could better use this longstanding
legislative tool to mitigate the democratic deficits that accompany broad
delegations of lawmaking authority to federal agencies. This discussion is
inevitably preliminary, focusing on the bigger-picture framing and
leaving the implementation details to those with more expertise in the
legislative process. Part IV.A sketches out the various tools Congress
could use to force regular reauthorization, whereas Part IV.B grapples
with potential objections to Congress’s use of this reauthorization toolbox.
Part IV.C explores a number of potential side benefits that this legislative
toolbox will produce beyond addressing the delegation issue.

Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-329, 130 Stat. 2969, 3038 (2017) (reflecting
the number of pages taken up with public laws).
279 See Gersen, supra note 135, at 252–53.
280 E.g., USA PATRIOT ACT of 2001, H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. § 224 (2001)
(enacted).
281 E.g., Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 (1791).
282 E.g., CBO REPORT, supra note 179, at 1.
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Implementation of Regular Reauthorization Regime

When it comes to implementing a regular reauthorization regime,
there are two main issues: the breadth of the reauthorization mandate;
and the means to encourage congressional compliance with the
reauthorization requirement.

Breadth of Reauthorization Mandate
History gives us a number of alternatives—some more sweeping than
others—for tailoring the breadth of the reauthorization mandate. As
Thomas Merrill has remarked, “[s]unset provisions come in various forms.
They can apply to entire statutes, to particular statutory provisions, to
agency regulations and programs, or to administrative agencies
themselves.”283 On the one extreme, Congress could consider enacting a
universal sunset statute that would require the reauthorization of any
federal agency or program within a certain number of years. As discussed
in Part III.A, many state sunset laws, for instance, applied across the
board. The failure to reauthorize would lead the sun to set on the entire
agency or program, thus barring any subsequent appropriation.
This one-size-fits-all approach would be bold, yet foolish.284 It would
certainly need to be designed to avoid the dramatic bottleneck Congress
would encounter in potentially having to reauthorize everything at once.
The legislation would need to spread out the reauthorization
requirements over a number of years, taking into account the work of each
authorizing committee.
Congress can and should be more nimble in its reauthorization
approach. Statutes vary, and action-forcing reforms may not be
appropriate for all regulatory contexts.285 For some federal programs and
perhaps some entire federal agencies, it might make sense to incorporate
express sunset provisions. Such a blanket sun-setting threat would force
Congress to take a fresh look at the agency’s regulatory activities and
whether the program or agency continues to effectively fulfill the purpose
for which Congress created it.
A narrower program- or agency-specific sun-setting approach has the
additional benefit of involving the House and Senate authorizing
committees in deciding whether to include, and how to design, the sunset
provision. These committees are the same that exercise oversight
functions over the particular programs, agencies, and subject matters,
and thus are in a better position to tailor sunset provisions that take into
283 Easterbrook et al., supra note 171, at 347 (comments of Thomas Merrill).
284 Accord id. at 358 (comments of William Eskridge) (observing that

“sunsetting is not a one-size-fits-all solution” and that “[i]t may work better for
some statutory schemes than for others”).
285 For an example of how different sorts of lawmaking reforms might be best
suited to different sorts of problems, see Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked
Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009).
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account the unique characteristics of the particular regulatory areas. One
critical decision the authorizing committees will need to make is the size
of the authorization window before the sunset. For some regulatory
contexts, that window will be quite small, perhaps even within the same
presidential administration. As Romano has argued, such short time
limits may be particularly appropriate for new, temporary, or emergencydriven agency programs.286 For others, however, one could imagine a
larger window of five, seven, ten, or even more years. A longer time
horizon may be particularly appropriate where new administrative
programs require an extended period of time to implement or when the
agency programs might generate too much uncertainty or brinksmanship
for continuing programs. Indeed, such considerations may counsel against
the inclusion of any sunset provision.
Congress, moreover, does not face a binary choice between a complete
sunset of an agency/program or permanent legislation. It may also
incorporate statutory sunset defaults, to which the agency or program
resets if not reauthorized. For instance, in 2015, when Congress failed to
reauthorize the EXIM Bank for the first time in 81 years, the result was
not the agency’s closure.287 Instead, the expiration of authorization
merely resulted in the agency being unable to take on new customers; it
would continue to have statutory authority to service existing
customers.288 It is also worth noting that that particular lapse in
authorization lasted only a matter of months, and the reauthorization
resulted in a number of important legislative reforms to the agency289 and
another (roughly) four years until the next sunset deadline.290
In some regulatory contexts, it might be advantageous to set the
sunset default as something that would force Congress to revisit and
reauthorize the agency or program. In the case of regulatory agencies, the
lack of authorization could mean that an agency lacks the ability to act
with the force of law. In effect, without a valid authorization, it could not
be said that the agency has been delegated such authority.
Authorization for the Clean Air Act, to take one example, expired in
1998. Under this hypothetical proposal, the EPA would lack the ability to
promulgate new regulations, issue new permits to regulated facilities, and
perhaps even initiate new enforcement actions unless and until the Act
was reauthorized. The expired authorization would not affect the validity
of regulations already promulgated, however, nor would it prevent statelevel enforcement under previously approved state implementation plans
or the filing of citizen suits against facilities for violating existing permits,
regulations, or statutory provisions. Such a state of affairs would provide
ample incentive for environmentalist organizations and regulated firms
286 See Romano, supra note 25.
287 EXPORT-IMPORT BANK, supra note 217.
288 See THORUM, supra note 221.
289 E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 635e(b); 12 U.S.C. § 635e(l);
290 12 U.S.C. § 635f.
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to support reauthorization as each would find the default baseline
undesirable—thus providing Congress with the opportunity and, indeed,
the need to revisit and reconsider particularly obsolete or ineffective
provisions in the law, much as has occurred with the Farm Bill.
Similarly, in the immigration context, perhaps Congress would tie
reauthorization together for the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) and the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
(USCIS). Failure to reauthorize could result in these agencies being
unable to issue new removal orders and new visa and work permits for
those who are presently inside the United States, while preserving the
agencies’ ability to regulate such matters at entry and exit to the country.
In that sense, such a sunset default is reminiscent of the “hammer”
provisions Congress has incorporated into certain rulemaking processes
where an automatic agency action is triggered if the agency does not finish
the rulemaking within the statutorily mandated deadline.291
The idea, in other words, would be to set the default to avoid
catastrophic outcomes while still imposing significant costs on politically
diverse groups so as to increase political pressure and swift congressional
action. And, again, the authorizing committees would lead the way to craft
such sunset defaults, leveraging their expertise in the subject matter that
the committees gained through their oversight efforts. Sunset defaults
may be particularly effective when they, in effect, stop the agency from
growing but still allow the regulatory structure to remain in effect with
the essential maintenance functions continuing. In that sense, this
concept is somewhat analogous to what the federal government does when
there is a complete shutdown, in that essential employees continue to
ensure the agency’s provision of essential services.292 The difference
would be that Congress would set by statute which services would
continue under the sunset default. In other contexts, the more effective
sunset default may be to dramatically increase regulatory activity. In one
sense, that is what occurs in the above proposals of the EPA ceasing to
grant permits or the USCIS ceasing to grant visas and work permits.
A softer approach would shift away from reauthorization or sunset
provisions in agency organic statutes that require a governing statute to
be reauthorized and, instead, turn to the more modern innovation of
reauthorization of appropriations. As outlined in Part III.B, in addition to
temporary legislation and sunset provisions for certain federal programs
and agencies, Congress frequently inserts authorizations of
291 See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Congressional Control Over Agency

Rulemaking: The Nutrition Labeling and Education Act’s Hammer Provisions, 50
FOOD & DUG L.J. 149 (1995); Lazarus supra note 285 at 1225–26 (discussing
“hammer provisions in environmental law); Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L.
Glicksman, Congress, The Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in
Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE L.J. 819, 839 (1988) (same).
292 See COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET, Q&A: EVERYTHING
YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT GOVERNMENT SHUTDOWNS 1 (Feb. 12, 2019),
http://www.crfb.org/sites/default/files/QAShutdowns_Feb2019.pdf.
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appropriations provisions in substantive legislation. Indeed, when we talk
about reauthorization, these two concepts are conflated and confused.
Consider again, for instance, the CFTC. The CFTC has operated
without authorization of appropriations at least five times during its
almost half-century existence and currently is acting without
authorization.293 Then-CFTC Commissioner Walt Lukken referred to this
legislative process as “periodic reauthorization,” but it is technically the
process of periodic reauthorization of appropriations.294 By only tying
agency funding to reauthorization, Congress can lower the stakes a bit for
reauthorization. The agency remains in place; it just may have to stop
certain operations and programs that are expressly tied to that particular
appropriation.
One may respond that reauthorization of appropriations is toothless,
because it does not force Congress to reconsider the agency’s substantive
mandate, just its level of funding for operations. And that reauthorization
could result in a one-sentence, rubber-stamp amendment just extending
the authorization of appropriations. But that is not necessarily the case.
After all, the authorizing committees—not appropriations committees—
are in charge of reauthorizing appropriations, so they may invoke their
oversight authority and leverage their substantive expertise. Indeed,
Lukken has documented how CFTC reauthorization of appropriations has
led to a dramatic modernization of the CFTC’s statutory mandate.295 It
has also led to encouraging the CFTC to operate more effectively in order
to achieve a more routine reauthorization process that some of its sibling
financial regulators enjoy. After all, “[r]outine reauthorizations,” Lukken
observed, “must be earned over time, not simply granted.”296
Similar to tailoring general reauthorization to include sunset defaults,
Congress could design authorization of appropriations provisions to target
agency actions that would encourage Congress to reauthorize but not lead
to catastrophic outcomes. Perhaps an agency would continue to have
funding to enforce current regulations and permits, but not to make new
regulations or new permits. Congress could also target for reauthorization
of appropriations new agency programs or agency activities that touch on
emerging or changing technologies, so that the agency has better
incentives to respond to congressional wishes and secure congressional
approval.
To be sure, asking Congress to rethink its approach to reauthorization
or to reauthorization of appropriations is not a modest proposal. Perhaps
Congress should begin with the more incremental approach. At least
requiring, by statute, that the authorizing committees conduct some sort
of oversight over the federal agency or program before Congress can pass
293 See Lukken, supra note 194, n.4; 7 U.S.C. § 16(d).
294 See 7 U.S.C. § 16(d) (“There are authorized to be appropriated such sums

as are necessary to carry out this chapter for each of the fiscal years 2008 through
2013.”).
295 See Lukken, supra note 194.
296 Id.
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appropriations legislation to renew funding for that agency or program.
That would encourage authorizing committees to more closely monitor
agency regulatory activities, and it would also encourage federal agencies
to more carefully implement their statutory mandates and be more
responsive to their congressional principals.297
In sum, Congress has a diverse reauthorization toolkit, ranging from
an across-the-board sunset requirement to the modest requirement of
conducting oversight before allowing reappropriation of funding. These
are not new tools. But they could be incorporated more systemically in the
legislative process to encourage Congress to engage in more regular
legislative activity with respect to the statutes that govern federal
agencies and programs.

Means to Encourage Congressional Compliance
Even if Congress were to use this reauthorization toolbox more
systematically and effectively, such efforts would still fall short unless
Congress dusted off and more strictly enforced the more-than-a-centuryold House and Senate rules prohibiting Congress from appropriating
funds for unauthorized or expired federal agencies and programs. As
noted in Part III.B, appropriations committees, by chamber rules, have a
duty to identify proposed funding for unauthorized or expired federal
agencies and programs, and Congress has charged the CBO, by statute,
to report to Congress annually on which authorizations of appropriations
have already expired or will expire during the given fiscal year. The CBO
identified nearly 1,000 such expired authorizations of appropriations in
its 2019 report.298
Yet Congress apparently never enforces these rules against
appropriation without authorization. That is because the current rules
contemplate that a point of order must be raised—a procedural rule that
apparently is never invoked. And, even if it could be successfully invoked,
the House and Senate rules dictate that the Speaker of the House and the
Presiding Officer of the Senate would have to rule on whether the
appropriation lacks authorization.
To reverse this custom, the first step may be for various members of
Congress to unite in their calls for these chambers’ rules to be enforced
during the appropriations process. These calls could be backed by the
threat of members raising the point of order if there is not a good-faith
attempt at compliance. However, the Speaker or Presiding Officer may
still rule that the appropriation does not lack authorization, or the
chamber may decide to change its rules to avoid the appropriations
process stalling over such a procedural point of order.299
297 Cf. WALKER, supra note 137, at 17 (quoting an agency official, in explaining
why federal agencies assist Congress in legislative drafting, that “oversight is
always in the back of our minds”).
298 CBO REPORT, supra note 179, at 1.
299 For helpful guidance on how to navigate this congressional procedural
terrain, see SATURNO & YEH, supra note 194, at 4–7.
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The more lasting approach would be to encourage Congress to change
its rules in order to make the prohibition of appropriations without
authorization self-executing—albeit, still subject to majoritarian override.
Such an approach would shift the burden of inertia onto the cornercutters, and in so doing, could spur Congress into action.
A similar approach would be to include in the various authorizing
statutes express mandates that bar agencies from spending appropriated
funding on unauthorized or expired programs or operations. In this way,
even if the appropriations have not been authorized, Congress can still
include them in an appropriations bill. However, Congress would then
have to return to the authorizing statute and amend it before the agency
could spend any of the appropriated funds.
A more aggressive approach would be to provide for judicial review of
agency actions on the basis that they lack statutory authorization of
appropriations. Such a judicial-review provision could be inserted into
reauthorization statutes of agency organic statutes. Or, more ambitiously,
Congress could modernize Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act to expressly allow for judicial challenges to any agency action that
lacks statutory authorization of appropriations.300
The wisdom of judicial review in this context exceeds this Article’s
ambitions. But the bottom line is that Congress has various avenues for
creating incentives, if not commands, to prohibit the appropriation of
funding to federal programs or agencies that lack a current authorization
(or authorization of appropriations). And members of Congress need not
wait for a majority to attempt to move this project forward. A minority
just needs to unite to call for Congress to enforce its own, longstanding
rules, with the threat that they will use congressional procedure to try to
force Congress to do so.
* * *
This discussion of how to implement a regular reauthorization regime
is necessarily preliminary. Any approach to implementation requires
further development and empirical investigation. For instance, one needs
to carefully consider the internal dynamics of Congress at the committee,
leadership, and chamber levels, the role of congressional procedures and
norms, the effect on reauthorization of in divided versus unified
government, and the role of electoral pressures—just to name a few. More
in-depth study needs to be done regarding current attempts at regular
reauthorization, such as the eight snapshots depicted in Part III.B. We
hope this Article helps frame and spur that further investigation.

300 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (providing that a reviewing court can “hold unlawful

and set aside agency action” that is, inter alia, “in excess of statutory jurisdiction,
authority, or limitations, or short of statutory right” or “without observance of
procedure required by law”).
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Responses to Objections

We do not endeavor to defend the position that legislation is
constitutionally or normatively better than regulation when it comes to
making laws that affect core value judgments or that address questions
of major economic, political, or social significance—though our priors on
that debate should be quite apparent. Nor do we seek to provide a full
defense for the preference for temporary over permanent legislation.301
And, to be sure, there are strong critics that raise serious concerns.302
Instead, our main objective in this Article is to identify the underexplored
temporal problems with broad congressional delegations and suggest one
potential solution to this problem: regular, mandatory reauthorization of
federal programs and agencies.
That said, three objections merit at least a brief response in this
preliminary investigation of a regular reauthorization regime.

Congressional Incapacity
A common argument against an Article I renaissance in federal
lawmaking is that the federal government has become so vast and
complicated that Congress lacks the capacity to be a primary lawmaker.
This congressional incapacity argument is at least two-fold: Congress
lacks the expertise to make the laws, and it lacks sufficient time to
regularly legislate.
In the agency reauthorization context, this argument may take on
special significance. After all, federal regulation has become highly
technical and complex. Federal agencies employ tens of thousands of
scientists, economists, lawyers, and other experts to effectively regulate.
Similarly, there are hundreds of agencies implementing even more
statutes, such that reauthorization of all of those statutes would take
more time than Congress could ever allocate while still fulfilling its other
obligations to address new problems via legislation, complete regular
appropriations, and fulfill its other obligations, such as the Senate’s
advice and consent function for administrative and judicial nominations.
Indeed, mandatory reauthorization could displace resources necessary for
301 Others have attempted to carefully advance that defense. See, e.g., Gersen,
supra note 152, at 261–98 (assessing arguments on both sides and citing relevant
literature). Jacob Gersen, for instance, concludes: “Normatively, temporary
legislation should not be globally eschewed, and at least in specific policy domains
such as responses to newly recognized risk, there should be a presumptive
preference in favor of temporary legislation.” Id. at 298.
302 See, e.g., Rebecca M. Kysar, Lasting Legislation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1007,
1051–65 (2011). Kysar has argued that, instead of utilizing temporary legislation
to address the issue of delegation and time, Congress should embrace “dynamic
legislation,” by which “the legislative product itself may automatically update
without further action by Congress.” Rebecca M. Kysar, Dynamic Legislation, 167
U. PA. L. REV. 809 (2018); see also Lazarus, supra note 285 (discussing use of
legislative precommitment strategies as a means of addressing particularly
difficult policy challenges that defy legislative engagement).
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Congress to pursue other objectives which those who elected them would
prefer it prioritize. In other words, mandatory authorization could
interfere with politically accountable agenda-setting. The time-constraint
issues are particularly acute in light of the barriers in the Senate for quick
and efficient deliberation, including the legislative filibuster and the
cloture floor-time requirements.
Whereas the time-constraint argument raises serious concerns,
discussed below, the congressional expertise argument is less compelling.
Congress has the capacity to enhance its institutional capacity and
expertise; indeed, the historical innovation of standing authorizing
committees was a direct response to lawmaking power shifting to the
Executive Branch.303 More to the point, however, Congress does not
legislate on their own. It turns out that federal agencies are deeply
involved in helping to draft the legislation that grants them the discretion
to regulate and constrains such discretion. They do so by drafting
substantive legislation suggesting to Congress that they advance the
agency’s or the Administration’s policy preferences. They also “legislate
in the shadows,” as one of us has framed it, by providing confidential
technical drafting assistance on draft legislation proposed by Congress.304
The substantial role federal agencies play in the legislative process
may raise some separation-of-powers concerns—or perhaps not. But their
role does undercut the argument that Congress lacks access to the
expertise necessary to effectively legislate in these increasingly complex
regulatory areas. Federal agencies are Congress’s partners and agents in
this legislative process. And regulated entities and other interest groups
are similarly involved, sharing their expertise and lobbying for their
interests. One welcome side effect of regular reauthorization is that
members and their staff serving on the various standing authorizing
committees will necessarily gain greater subject-matter expertise, become
more familiar with the federal agencies their committees oversee, and
deepen the committees’ working relationship with those agencies.
The time constraints are more compelling—but not insurmountable.
After all, perhaps we should not worry too much about overtaxing a
system that seems to expend so much energy on what amounts to so little
of consequence these days. More to the point, Congress has developed a
potent toolbox of procedural mechanisms to incentivize more responsive
and timely legislative action. Congress may use unanimous consent or
other methods to expedite consideration of relatively noncontroversial
actions, including both legislative measures as well as the approval of
nominees (of which there are hundreds with each new Presidential
Administration).
When sufficient consensus does not exist, Congress can turn to other
legislative tools. The Congressional Review Act, discussed in Part II.B.
303 See, e.g., CHAFETZ, supra note 28, at 267–301 (detailing evolution standing
committees in House and Senate).
304 Walker, supra note 43.
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provides one example. There, Congress approved of a simple-majority
resolution process, such that the filibuster does not apply in the Senate.
Trade promotion authority, formerly known as fast track trade
authorization, is another example. That statutory innovation required
Congress to approve or deny the President’s trade negotiation, without
having the ability to amend or filibuster.305 One could imagine similar
legislative innovations being developed to efficiently process mandatory
reauthorization legislation. Bills could be fast-tracked and prioritized on
the calendar, amendments could be prohibited, the filibuster could be
bypassed, and floor debate-time and amendment process could be severely
limited—to just mention a few options.
Even with those innovations, however, Congress will need to be
deliberate in how they handle reauthorizations. The standing authorizing
committees will need to play an important role, and Congress may need
to rely even more heavily on subcommittees to conduct the oversight and
legislative development. The committees and the collective Congress will
need to space out the reauthorization deadlines over the years to ensure
sufficient committee and floor time to meet the deadlines and to minimize
distortion in Congress’s agenda-setting priorities. The time constraints
will impose costs, but we are not convinced such costs outweigh the
important benefits of Congress addressing the temporal problems of
delegation.

Anti-Regulatory Disposition
Especially in light of the costs in terms of congressional resources and
agenda-setting, some may argue that requiring regular reauthorization of
federal programs and agencies will create a bias against regulation.
Perhaps this proposal is just another example of what Gillian Metzger has
proclaimed is “a resurgence of the antiregulatory and antigovernment
forces that lost the battle of the New Deal.”306
Practical experience with sunset provisions and temporary
legislation, at both the state and federal level, does not support the claim
that such mechanisms are inherently anti-regulatory. At the state level,
sunset requirements appear to have done more to encourage legislative
engagement and oversight of administrative agencies than to eliminate or
prevent regulation.307 At the federal level, periodic reauthorization has
been used to update—and often to increase the stringency of—regulatory
statutes, such as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.308 As Bill
Eskridge has observed, “sunsetting can also increase regulatory ambition
305 See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, All Aboard the Congressional Fast Track:
From Trade to Beyond, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 687 (1996).
306 See Metzger, supra note 30, at 2.
307 See Baugus & Bose, supra note 153, at 19; Kearney, supra note 166, at 50.
308 See Easterbrook et al., supra note 171, at 347 (comments of Thomas
Merrill); see also id. 353–54 (comments of William Eskridge, discussing example
of Voting Rights Act).
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and agency authority.”309 This is particularly true when one considers
that federal agencies play a substantial role in drafting the legislation—
oftentimes “legislating in the shadows” through confidential technical
drafting assistance.310
An unstated assumption of the “anti-regulatory” critique is that
legislatures are necessarily more hostile to regulatory intervention than
administrative agencies. While there are reasons to suspect that agencies
will tend to support measures that enhance their own power and
influence, there are reasons to doubt the underlying claim. However much
influence economic interests have in the legislative process, such interests
are also the dominant participants within the administrative process.311
It is certainly true that Congress sometimes delegates power to
administrative agencies with the hope or expectation that such agencies
will promulgate regulations that members of Congress were unwilling to
overtly embrace. Yet it is also true that Congress sometimes delegates
responsibility for developing regulations to agencies as a means of
forestalling or preventing the adoption of such rules, such as occurred
with the first federal vehicle emission standards.312
Whatever its faults, the legislative process tends to be more open and
transparent than the administrative process. As a comparative matter,
we suggest that members of Congress are more accountable for their votes
in favor or against substantive legislative proposals than they are for
supporting or opposing the grant of power to federal agencies.313 Having
to debate and deliberate over the reauthorization of specific laws may help
facilitate the arrival of “republican moments” of the sort that have led to
significant bouts of lawmaking.314 David Schoenbrod, who spent years at
the Natural Resources Defense Council trying to reduce lead air pollution,
309 Id. at 357 (comments of William Eskridge).
310 See Walker, supra note 43, at 1416 (concluding that “the relationship

between individual members of Congress (and congressional committees) and
federal agencies may elevate the risk that legislating in the shadows leads to
excessive delegation of interpretive and policymaking authority in ways that
contravene the will of the collective Congress”).
311 See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in
the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN.
L. REV. 99 (2011) (documenting “interest group imbalances” within the
administrative processes). See generally RACHEL AUGUSTINE POTTER, BENDING
THE RULES: PROCEDURAL POLITICKING IN THE BUREAUCRACY (2019).
312 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON & ORG. 313, 330-33 (1985); see
also DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 24-25
(2005).
313 See generally E. SCOTT ADLER & JOHN D. WILKERSON, CONGRESS AND THE
POLITICS AND PROBLEM SOLVING (2013) (exploring how Congress is held electorally
responsible for its collective problem-solving ability and why that leads to
successful legislation even during periods of deep partisanship divide).
314 See generally Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental
Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59 (1992).
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makes a plausible case that Congress would have done more to reduce
lead from gasoline—and more quickly—had it been unable to simply
delegate the question to the EPA and been forced to address the issue
directly.315
At the same time, it is undeniable that Congress is unlikely to support
the continuation or reauthorization of costly and expansive federal
regulatory programs where such programs face significant political
opposition. In the early 1990s, there was significant political support for
adopting a series of regulatory reform measures when reauthorizing
federal environmental laws. Although the reforms had bipartisan
support, they were opposed by the House leadership and most major
environmentalist organizations. Because there were no real consequences
from failing to renew the authorizations of “expired” statutes, the
reauthorization bills were shelved, preventing the adoption of regulatory
reforms for which there appeared to be significant political support.316
Overall, the primary effect of sunsets or reauthorization requirements
should be to bring more regular legislative engagement and greater
democratic accountability. In some cases this is likely to result in greater
federal regulation, and in other cases not. If there is broad support for
increased regulation, requiring reauthorization should produce that
result in a more accountable way than the status quo, particularly if
reauthorization requirements are drafted in a way that incentivizes broad
engagement in the reauthorization process and makes it difficult for
Congress to shirk responsibility. Yet while sunsets and reauthorization
requirements may not tilt the playing field for or against regulation, we
expect that the contours of existing agency authority would evolve quite
differently than without such requirements in place. Forced to
reauthorize programs on a regular basis, Congress is more likely to
consider whether prior delegations of authority match with contemporary
demands and understandings. Were Congress forced to revisit the Clean
Air Act, for example, it is possible that Congress would enact provisions
delegating authority tailored to contemporary problems, such as climate
change, rather than leave the EPA to attempt to shoehorn such concerns
into the regulatory structures drafted to address different sorts of
environmental concerns.

Regulatory Uncertainty and Distorted Policymaking
A more potent objection might be that regular reauthorization
requirements could induce greater regulatory uncertainty. After all, as
Aaron Nielson has framed it, federal agencies can promulgate “sticky
regulations,” which bring more certainty and reliability to the regulatory
315 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 312, at 29–38.
316 See John H. Cushman, Jr., Environmental Lobby Beats Tactical Retreat,

N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1994; see also Draft Legislative Strategy Paper Developed by
Environmental Group Lobbyists Dated March 5, 1994, BNA NAT’L ENV. DAILY,
Mar. 16, 1994.
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scheme and thus “create incentives designed to encourage regulated
parties to develop technologies that help agencies accomplish their longterm goals.”317 There is no question that the prospect of regular legislative
reauthorization introduces the prospect that existing regulatory
requirements could change, and perhaps change more quickly than occurs
with informal rulemaking. Others may be concerned that regular
reauthorization and legislative engagement will result in distorted
policymaking due to log-rolling and the influence of interest groups.
Such concerns are real, but can be ameliorated in various ways.
Among other things, Congress could draft reauthorization requirements
that are forward-looking. As suggested above, one way to incentivize
reauthorization is to require agency action to be authorized if agencies are
to act with the force of law, but not to eliminate existing rules or
regulations when agency authorizations expire. If reauthorization occurs
on a regular schedule, it will also be possible for the regulated community
to anticipate when existing regulatory frameworks are “in play,” and to
plan accordingly.
The prospect of reauthorization will certainly encourage interest
groups, economic and otherwise, to be more engaged in the legislative
process, but that can be a feature as much as a bug. Legislative dealmaking, coalition-building, and compromise are all essential features of
legislating. Log-rolling and rent-seeking are undoubtedly part-and-parcel
of the legislative process, but that is inherent in democratic decisionmaking within a representative republic. Moreover, it is not as if rentseeking is absent from the administrative process—though rent-seeking
at the agency level may well be less transparent. The aim of this proposal
is to encourage more legislative engagement, because of the benefits that
brings; this is not a cure-all designed to address every inadequacy or
pathology within contemporary policymaking.

C.

Implications Beyond Nondelegation

Although Congress engaging in regular reauthorization could result
in some of the costs discussed in Part IV.B, it would, of course, also
produce some important benefits.
Central to this Article, such legislative activity would help Congress
address the temporal problems of broad, decades-old delegations of
lawmaking power to federal agencies. Regular reauthorization should
encourage Congress to revisit such delegations—giving Congress an
opportunity to update old statutory delegations, revisit unpopular ones,
and rein in or redirect agency actions inconsistent with current
congressional and electoral preferences. In so doing, Congress could more
easily modernize statutes in light of improved scientific understandings
or other changing circumstances, and in turn improve agency efficiency
and effectiveness. Congress would also be in a better position to more
easily narrow overly broad delegations granted by prior Congresses.
317 Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 90 (2018).
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Regular reauthorization would also produce a number of incidental
benefits. A couple are worth briefly exploring here: how it would help
strengthen the relationship between Congress and federal agencies; and
how it would help alleviate some of the concerns about judicial deference
doctrines.

Relationship Between Congress and Agencies
In their landmark study on statutory drafting within Congress, Lisa
Bressman and Abbe Gluck reported that the congressional drafters
surveyed perceived “agencies as the everyday statutory interpreters,
viewed interpretive rules as tools for agencies, too, and made no
distinction, as some scholars have, between agency statutory
‘implementation’ and agency statutory ‘interpretation.”’318 A companion
study of federal agency rule drafters reached a similar conclusion: Federal
agencies—and not federal courts—are the primary partners of Congress
in agency statutory interpretation and law implementation.319
As one of us has empirically explored in a report commissioned by the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS), federal agencies
play a critical and substantial role in drafting statutes. “Indeed, they are
often the chief architects of the statutes they administer. Even when
federal agencies are not the primary substantive authors, they routinely
respond to congressional requests to provide technical assistance in
statutory drafting.”320 It turns out that federal agencies provide statutory
drafting assistance on the vast majority of proposed legislation that
directly affects them and on most legislation that gets enacted—
regardless whether the legislation would be detrimental to the agency.321
Agency officials report that their agencies engage in this legislative
drafting assistance for a number of reasons, including to maintain a
healthy and productive working relationship with Congress and to
educate the congressional staffers about the agency’s existing statutory
and regulatory framework.322
A regular reauthorization process would only increase the opportunity
for meaningful interaction between the congressional principal and its
administrative agents. Indeed, of the ten agencies studied in the ACUS
report, one agency—the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)—
engaged in a regular reauthorization process. The USDA is involved in
the Farm Bill reauthorization that takes place every 5-6 years. Those
interviewed at the USDA emphasized how these reauthorization efforts
greatly strengthened the agency’s relationship with its authorizing and
318 Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the

Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the
Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 767 (2014)
319 Walker, supra note 24, at 1051–52.
320 WALKER, supra note 137, at 1.
321 See id. at 13–20 (reporting relevant findings from agency interviews and
follow-up survey).
322 Id. at 17–18.
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oversight committees in Congress.323 If reauthorization were more
common, other agencies would no doubt have similar opportunities to
strengthen their relationship with Congress and thus be able to better
understand, and be responsive to, current congressional preferences.
Congress, in turn, would have more opportunities to reshape statutory
mandates to respond to agency feedback on current challenges and new
circumstances.

Effects on Judicial Deference Doctrines
In recent years, we have seen a growing call to rethink administrative
law’s deference doctrines to federal agency interpretations of law.324 As is
relevant here, Chevron deference commands a reviewing court to defer to
an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute the agency
administers so long as it is reasonable.325
One of the core challenges to Chevron deference is that it interferes
with Congress’s legislative role. In particular, Article I vests Congress
with “All legislative Powers,” yet Chevron deference encourages members
of Congress to delegate broad lawmaking power to federal agencies. As
Third Circuit Judge Kent Jordan put it, “The consequent aggrandizement
of federal executive power at the expense of the legislature leads to
perverse incentives, as Congress is encouraged to pass vague laws and
leave it to agencies to fill in the gaps, rather than undertaking the difficult
work of reaching consensus on divisive issues.”326
The constitutional challenge to Chevron deference strikes us as
lacking, at least in its current form. But Judge Jordan’s observation
nevertheless carries considerable force as a normative matter. Not only
does Chevron deference encourage Congress to delegate broadly, but it
also discourages Congress from revisiting prior delegations. This is
problematic not just because Congress is unlikely to revisit an agency
statutory interpretation that a court has identified as a reasonable but
not optimal interpretation. Bill Eskridge has made a similar observation
as to the democratic dangers of permanent legislation:
One of the realities you have to confront is that when Congress passes
these [permanent] statutes, however specific or general they are,
Congress sets afloat a ship in an ocean that Congress is not
necessarily going to control. The steering of the ship is not by
members of Congress; it’s mainly by agencies, with judges often
playing an important role as well. So the interaction of agency
interpretations, judicial pushback, agency response, and group
323 See id. at 48–51 (USDA case study).
324 For a summary of these recent challenges, see Christopher J. Walker,

Attacking Auer and Chevron Deference: A Literature Review, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 103 (2018).
325 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43
(1984).
326 Egan v. Del. River Port Auth., 851 F.3d 263, 279 (3d Cir. 2017) (Jordan, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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responses to all of this creates a very, very different statute. There is
a genuine danger in our republic where the dynamic lawmaking,
which is inherent in our separation of powers, removes important
statutory mandates like the Voting Rights Act from the democratic
process and from any sense of democratic accountability. 327

The lack of any serious threat of legislative action, moreover, may
encourage federal agencies to be even bolder in their regulatory efforts.
Indeed, empirical work on agency rule drafters suggests that the mere
threat of more searching review—or, here, the threat of congressional
attention—would encourage federal agencies to interpret statutes less
“aggressively.”328 Unless there is a serious threat of legislative action,
“agencies may come to view congressional oversight as just the cost of
doing business and not a real constraint on regulatory activity.”329
For many of us, Chevron deference has become far more problematic
in the current era of congressional inaction. Congress appears to have no
capacity or willpower to intervene when an agency has used statutory
ambiguity to pursue a policy inconsistent with current congressional
wishes, much less when an agency’s organic statute is so outdated as to
not equip the agency with authority and direction to address new
technologies, challenges, and circumstances. If Congress were to engage
in a regular reauthorization process, however, many of these concerns
would be alleviated. Were Congress required to revisit agency statutory
interpretations and delegations, courts would not have to worry as much
about broad delegations, and they would not have less occasion to rely on
arguments concerning legislative acquiescence.
Regular reauthorization may also produce similar salutary effects for
another judicial deference doctrine: statutory stare decisis. The doctrine
of stare decisis commands courts to not revisit judicial precedent absent
some “special justification” beyond mere wrongness.330 And, when it
comes to statutory holdings—as opposed to constitutional ones—stare
decisis carries “special force.”331 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stressed
that statutory stare decisis applies “whether [the Court’s] decision focused
327 See Easterbrook et al., supra note 171, at 358 (comments of William

Eskridge).
328 Christopher J. Walker, Chevron Inside the Regulatory State: An Empirical
Assessment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 703, 715–28 (2014).
329 Walker, supra note 123, at 1119; see also id. at 1119 n.68 (noting that
“[t]his is a paraphrase of Philip Wallach’s excellent observation at the 2017
American Bar Association Administrative Law Conference”).
330 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2407 (2014)
(quoting Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000)); accord Kimble v.
Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2409 (2015) (“Respecting stare decisis
means sticking to some wrong decisions. The doctrine rests on the idea, as Justice
Brandeis famously wrote, that it is usually ‘more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”’ (quoting Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting))).
331 BRYAN A. GARNER ET AL., THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT 333 (2016)
(“Stare decisis applies with special force to questions of statutory construction.”).
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only on statutory text or also relied . . . on the policies and purposes
animating the law.”332 Stare decisis currently carries more force in the
statutory context, the Court has explained, because those who think the
judiciary got the issue wrong “can take their objections across the street,
and Congress can correct any mistake it sees.”333
If Congress continues its current trend of legislative inaction, one
could imagine growing calls—similar to those already being raised
against Chevron deference—for the Court to reconsider its approach to
statutory stare decisis. Regular reauthorization would hopefully alleviate
some of those concerns by forcing Congress to revisit existing statutes
more regularly, especially those statutes that have been interpreted by
agencies and courts in a way inconsistent with current congressional
wishes.

CONCLUSION
Although four Justices expressed interest last Term in revitalizing the
nondelegation doctrine334 and Justice Kavanaugh joined that call this
Term,335 the Supreme Court is unlikely to rediscover an administrable
principle in the nondelegation doctrine any time soon. Congress will
continue to face myriad incentives to delegate broad statutory authority
to federal agencies and few incentives to revisit those broad delegations.
And the President and federal agencies will continue to leverage such
delegated authority. It will be difficult to change the legislative process
(or constitutional doctrine) to decrease the breadth of statutory delegation
to federal agencies.
So perhaps combatting the breadth of statutory delegations is the
wrong focus. Or at least we should not focus myopically on breadth.
Instead, as this Article argues, we should also attend to the overlooked
temporal problems of delegation. In other words, not only is the breadth
of delegation problematic. So is that fact that federal agencies use
decades-old congressional delegations of authority to regulate new
technologies and circumstances that were wholly unanticipated by the
enacting Congress and perhaps would not garner support in the current
Congress.

332 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409 (quoting Halliburton, 134 S. Ct. at 2411); see

also Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, A Qualified Defense of Qualified
Immunity, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1853, 1856 (2018) (“Even Justice Thomas, who
gives the least weight to stare decisis of all the current Justices, appears to
acknowledge its force when it comes to statutes.”).
333 Kimble, 135 S. Ct. at 2409.
334 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2131 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting); id. (Alito, J., concurring in judgment).
335 Paul v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 342, 342 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., respecting
the denial of certiorari) (“Like Justice Rehnquist’s opinion 40 years ago, Justice
Gorsuch’s thoughtful Gundy opinion raised important points that may warrant
further consideration in future cases.”).

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3510688
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423062

60

WORKING DRAFT

[Dec. 2019

Unlike the breadth problem of congressional delegation, the temporal
problem has a plausible path forward, albeit a difficult one. Congress
needs to return to a regular practice of legislating and, in so doing, revisit
prior delegations of authority to federal agencies. To encourage such
legislative action, Congress should engage in regular reauthorization of
federal agencies and programs and should take seriously its foundational
rule against appropriation without authorization.

Electroniccopy
copyavailable
available at:
at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3510688
Electronic
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3423062

